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Abstract
The rise of card-based payments has transformed the landscape of payments in the last
half century, from one dominated by government-supported paper-based payments to one
dominated by wholly private systems. The rise of those payments presents a number of policy
problems, the most serious of which is the empirically demonstrable likelihood that use of the
cards contributes to an undue level of consumer credit and that borrowing on the cards
contributes to a rise in the level of consumer bankruptcy. Although the existing pattern shows
great variation from country to country, regulators should take no solace in those variations.
Building on existing historical research and on detailed contemporaneous data about the
patterns of usage around the world, I show that the differences reflect the youth of the system,
and the fact that some countries were less suited to rapid takeup of credit cards than others. The
pressures of globalization are rapidly driving convergence in card usage, except in those
countries that have adopted substantial “speed bumps” to slow the growth of cards.
The natural question, then, is what policies will be useful to confine the problems related
to credit cards without creating undue inefficiencies in retail payment systems. The ideal
response would be one that encouraged debit cards – protecting the cost savings of electronic
payments without the externalities generated by credit card usage. It is not easy, however, to
devise policy responses that fit that goal. The closing part of this paper analyzes four different
reforms that might be useful to policymakers of different perspectives: (a) permitting merchant
credit card surcharges; (b) barring affinity programs, especially those that are conditioned on
borrowing; (c) barring marketing to minors; and (d) reorganizing the disclosure system to focus
on the behavioral problems that make cards problematic. Among other things, this suggests a
shift in emphasis away from disclosures in account agreements to disclosures at the point of sale.
Thus, for example, I reject recent proposals to provide enhanced disclosures for universal default
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provisions. On the contrary, I argue that those provisions should be banned from credit card
agreements entirely, with a view to causing card issuers to contract the credit they extend to
those that are demonstrably in financial distress.

GLOBAL CREDIT CARD USE AND DEBT:
POLICY ISSUES AND REGULATORY RESPONSES
I. INTRODUCTION
Since they first appeared in the 1950s, electronic payment cards have transformed
the practice of retail payment. The dominant payment systems at the time were cash and
checks, both systems substantially unchanged for hundreds of years, and both largely
government administered and subsidized. Yet only a half century after the introduction
of cards, more money is spent on cards than on cash and checks combined.1 That shift to
a wholly private and electronic payment system raises unprecedented policy problems.
Thus, it should be no surprise that card-based payment systems have been the
focal point of regulatory inquiry in recent years. Most obvious have been major antitrust
inquiries, reflecting the concern of regulators around the world that anti-competitive
behavior by the dominant networks has thwarted competition by smaller networks. There
also is a growing concern throughout the developed world about the sustainability of
credit card usage and debt. Specifically, some have argued that widespread use of credit
cards can contribute to excess consumption, and ultimately to an undue incidence of
financial distress.2 Likewise, policymakers around the world struggle with bankruptcy
reform, striving to achieve a balance that adequately promotes risk- taking yet still
discourages strategic bankruptcy.
I am most interested in the problems associated with credit card usage and debt,
although I recognize that the competitiveness of the market has complex ramifications for
the usage problem. Considering that focus, I have conducteda multi-country analysis of
the relation between credit cards and financial distress, which analyzes data about
consumer bankruptcy filings and borrowing from Australia, Canada, Japan, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. Unlike the existing scholarship on that point, my
empirical analysis directly examines the effect of credit card borrowing in general – not
just credit card defaults – and uses statistical techniques that separate the effect of credit
card borrowing in particular from consumer borrowing in general. As I explain in the

1

In the UK, debit and credit card spending overtook cash for the first time in 2004. See
http://www.apacs.org.uk/downloads/Plastic%20Day%20FINAL.pdf. In the USA, card-based
systems overtook cash and checks for the first time in 2003.
See
http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB109053116869571496-email,00.html.
2

See Diane Ellis, The Effect of Consumer Interest Rate Deregulation on Credit Card
Volumes, Charge-offs, and the Personal Bankruptcy Rate, Bank Trends 98-05 (FDIC, Div. of
Ins., Mar. 1998); Robert M. Lawless, The Relationship Between Nonbusiness Bankruptcy
Finlings and Various Basic Measures of Consumer Debt (2002 e-article); JULIET B. SCHOR, THE
OVERSPENT AMERICAN (1998); Joanna Stavins, Credit Card Borrowing, Delinquency, and
Personal Bankruptcy, NEW ENGLAND ECON. REV., July/Aug. 2000, at 15; Elizabeth Warren, The
Bankruptcy Crisis, 73 IND. L.J. 1079 (1998).
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related paper that presents the results of that analysis,3 the analysis suggests two
empirical relationships of great policy significance. First, growth in credit card spending
relates to subsequent growth in consumer credit. Second, more provocatively, growth in
credit card debt – even if overall borrowing is constant – relates to subsequent growth in
consumer bankruptcy filings. The gist of it is that credit card spending leads naturally to
increases in borrowing, and that the borrowing that takes place on credit cards is too easy,
so easy that borrowers fail to appreciate the risks they would see if they borrowed the
money in a more traditional way. Those findings raise important policy questions,
coming as they do on the heels of reports showing additional increase s in consumer
bankruptcy filings in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Those findings resonate with recent concerns about the structure of credit card
contracts and products. For example, there is a widespread regulatory concern in this
country about “universal default” provisions. Those provisions generally permit an issuer
of one card to raise the rate on that card solely because of a default in a payment to
another creditor. The primary regulatory strategy to date has been to criticize the
disclosure of those terms – the idea being that consumers have not been given fair
warning that a default on one card will cause an increase in the rates they pay on all of
their cards. The academic literature, however, suggests a more pervasive problem with
the substantive design of the provisions of credit card contracts. Building on the
behavioral economic literature, Oren Bar-Gill argues that the products that credit card
issuers market to consumers are systematically designed to take advantage of common
cognitive defects that limit the ability of the typical consumer to price the terms
accurately.4 For example, Bar-Gill argues that issuers are driven to compete for
customers based on “teaser rates” and “annual fees,” rather than on the longer-term
interest rates or default terms that might be more important to consumers in distress.5
The juxtaposition of those serious policy concerns with the rapid global growth in
credit card use presents an apt topic for comparative study. As it happens, central banks,
legislative bodies, and regulatory agencies around the world have taken divergent
approaches to address these policy concerns. In some countries—including the United
States—regulatory activities have focused on efforts to improve consumer choice and
decisionmaking through disclosure requirements and marketing restrictions. As I discuss
below, many other countries have imposed stringent limitations on borrowing or on card

3

See Ronald J. Mann, Credit Cards, Consumer Credit, and Bankruptcy (unpublished
January 2005 manuscript) [hereinafter Mann, Cards Data Paper].
4

See Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373 (2004). Bar-Gill’s
work builds on and resembles a sophisticated economics literature. E.g., Stefano Dellavigna &
Ulrike Malmendier, Contract Design and Self Control: Theory and Evidence 199 QUARTERLY
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 353 (2004).
5

As I discuss in Mann, Cards Data Paper, supra note 3, I am not sure that Bar-Gill’s
arguments about product design are correct. There are rational forces that drive competition in
the same direction. Still, his arguments about the way that behavioral problems force competitive
issuers to focus on cognitive defects is powerful.
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use. The point of this Article is to provide general assessment of the potential policy
initiatives that could be brought to bear on the problem.6
This analysis is complicated by the fact that a complete account of the economic
effects of the credit card must recognize the positive contributions the credit card makes
to a market economy. As a payment system, it doubtless is one of the most efficient
vehicles ever devised. For one thing, because transaction authorization, processing, and
payment proceeds on an almost entirely electronic basis, it is substantially cheaper than
the traditional paper-based payment systems (such as checks) that it has supplanted.7
Given the difficulties market actors have had in building sufficient networks to penetrate
the consumer market with electronic payment systems that are not card-based,8 it is a
testament to the value that the credit card provides that it has penetrated that market so
pervasively.
The benefits of electronic processing are even more striking for the credit
transactions effectuated with the card. If a credit card is a lot cheaper for a bank to
process than a check, consider how much cheaper it is for a consumer to borrow $300
with a credit card than it would be to borrow the same amount of money through a
conventional bank loan. Putting aside the fees that the bank loan would involve, the
activities of traveling to the bank, explaining the purpose of the purchase, and verifying
the consumer’s creditworthiness are likely to be tens if not hundreds of times as timeconsuming as the parallel credit card process, even if we include the time spent filling out
the limited amount of information required on a modern American credit card
application. Similarly, the separation between the point of underwriting and the point of
borrowing makes credit card lending particularly valuable as a safety net for consumers
in distress. Distressed families can use credit cards to respond to financial crises even
after the crises have occurred. It is much less likely that they could obtain conventional
bank financing at such a time.9

6

This Article does not, however, consider potential bankruptcy reforms, where national
approaches also diverge. So, in 2004, England liberalized the discharge provisions of its
consumer bankruptcy systems, to encourage increased risk taking by reducing the stigma attached
to bankruptcy. The United States enacted similar legislation in 1978, but the United States
Congress is now considering proposals to limit the discharge provision, at the behest of credit
card issuers. See Mann, Cards Data Paper, supra note 3. The basic problem is that academics
and policymakers fundamentally disagree as to whether consumer bankruptcy is caused by
profligate spending patterns associated with the lack of stigma in bankruptcy or whether it is
primarily caused with external catastrophic occurrences such as job loss, medical crisis, or
divorce.
7

See Daniel D. Garcia Swartz, Robert W. Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, The Economics of
a Cashless Society: An Analysis of the Costs and Benefits of Payment Instruments (AEIBrookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Related Publication 04-24) (September 2004).
8

See RONALD J. MANN & JANE KAUFMAN WINN, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (2nd ed.

9

See Mann, Cards Data Paper, supra note 3.

2005).
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It is difficult to balance those benefits against the costs that credit cards impose.
Because the magnitude of the costs and benefits are difficult to compare, it is at least
possible that the costs exceed the benefits to such an extent that it would be appropriate to
ban credit cards entirely. My sense, however, is that the benefits are quite substantial in
relation to the costs. Hence, I focus more closely on initiatives that do not have the
purpose or effect of banning any large class of credit card transactions.10 Thus, my goal
is to design reforms that are likely to respond more specifically to the problem identified
above – prodigal borrowing. Generally, I discuss reforms designed to alter the decisions
of consumers so as to lessen the likelihood of imprudent borrowing, without at the same
time decreasing the attractiveness of the benefits that come with it. I am sensitive to the
risk that I might fall into the easy compromise – so typical of American consumer
regulation – of proposing purely informational protections that expend resources without
altering consumer behavior in any noticeable way. I hope that the discussion that follows
evinces adequate concern to design reforms that can target the transactions that are
problematic, without hindering the value-increasing transactions for which cards are
used.
To understand the background against which the policy initiatives operate, it is
necessary to understand how and why cards are used as they are. Accordingly, Part II
describes the global patterns of credit and debit card use, including the institutional, legal
and cultural factors affecting those usage patterns. The basic premise of that discussion
is that the major differences in usage that exist today are much more attributable to the
relics of conditions at the time the cards first were introduced. I argue that in developed
economies participating in the global economy, the logic of globalization will force rapid
convergence on a card-dominated payment system except in countries that are willing to
maintain substantial institutional obstacles to the use of cards. Thus, the problems
evident in the highly developed countries covered by my statistical analysis are likely –
absent some vigorous policy interventions – to spread throughout the developed and
globalized economies of the world.
Part III, in turn, considers the types of policy responses that regulators might use
to guide the development of card-based payment systems. The basic point is that
regulations that stem credit card use, and particularly credit card borrowing, can be
designed to limit the costs of the financial distress that attends growth in credit card use.
Generally, it considers three separate styles of regulation: rules permitting merchant
surcharges, regulation of affinity programs (which bridge policies related to pricing and
information); and information regulation, limiting the types of programs issuers can use

10

I also am motivated in part by the desire to propose politically palatable solutions to the
problems that I discern. More generally, the value of prohibitory consumer credit regulation
seems to me so closely tied to the system for consumer bankruptcy in a particular country that the
two cannot be considered separately. As I explain in Ronald J. Mann, Regulating Consumer
Credit and Consumer Bankruptcy: A Comparative Analysis (unpublished January 2005
manuscript) [hereinafter Mann, Backlash], that leads me to favor an open bankruptcy discharge
over directly prohibitory consumer credit regulations.
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to stimulate consumer use of their products, all with a view to stimulating more rational
use of cards.
On the first point, I recommend an initiative that would directly validate creditcard surcharges by merchants. Second, I suggest a ban on affinity programs (cash-back
and airline-miles programs being the most obvious), because they give cardholders an
unduly large incentive to use credit cards. On the third point, I recommend a flat ban on
marketing to minors and college students, extending a similar ban that already exists in
UK law. Finally, and most importantly, I recommend a general reorganization of the
disclosure regime in the Truth in Lending Act. The current disclosure system focuses on
disclosures at the time of the application or the time the cardholder reads the monthly bill.
If the point of the problem is the point at which cardholders purchase and borrow,
disclosures at those points are more likely to be effective. Thus, I doubt the value of
proposals to extend more detailed disclosure requirements to deal with such things as
universal default provisions. If policymakers are concerned about those provisions (as I
think they should be), a more appropriate response is to ban them entirely.
II. GLOBAL PATTERNS OF CARD USE
A.

How Are Cards Used?

To make any sense of the varied policy responses that different countries have
considered and implemented with respect to card-based systems, it is important to
understand something about the use of credit and debit cards worldwide. Currently, card
use differs substantially on almost any criterion one might care to offer. For example, as
shown in Figure One, even in highly developed countries the rate of card usage varies
from low-use countries like South Africa and Japan, with less than 20 transactions per
person per year, to moderate-use countries like Australia and the UK (about 70
transactions per person), to high-use countries – Canada and the USA (about 115
transactions per person).
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FIGURE ONE
CARD TRANSACTIONS PER CAPITA (2001)
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The differences in the types of cards people use for those transactions are equally
striking. For example, Figure Two shows that the share of card transactions conducted
on debit cards varies widely from countries like Japan and South Africa, where debit
cards are almost never used, to countries like Belgium, Sweden and the Netherlands,
where credit cards are almost never used. For countries that use both cards with some
frequency, there is a variation between countries like the United States and Australia,
where credit cards are used more frequently than debit cards, to countries like Canada
and UK, where debit cards are used more frequently than credit cards.
FIGURE TWO
CREDIT CARD TRANSACTIONS/
TOTAL CARD TRANSACTIONS (2001)
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As discussed below, the share of transactions on credit cards to total card
transactions is declining in many countries. Still, the number of credit card transactions
per capita remains quite high in many countries (Figure Three).
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FIGURE THREE
CREDIT CARD TRANSACTIONS PER CAPITA (2001)
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To understand broader market effects of cards, it is important to look not only at
the number of transactions, but on the value of the transactions. Using card spending as a
share of GDP equalizes the metric across various countries.11 As Figure Four illustrates,
credit card spending as a percent of GDP ranges from 13% in the US to less than 2% in
certain EU countries.
FIGURE FOUR
CREDIT CARD SPENDING/GDP (2001)
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As suggested in the introduction, perhaps the most important policy concerns
arise from the relation between credit cards and debt. Figure Five displays a ratio of
outstanding credit card debt to annual credit card volume, which shows the extent to
which credit card use reflects borrowing. As Figure Five shows, the ratio varies even in
highly developed countries from a high in the United States of more than 50% to a low of
11

I use this metric in Mann, Cards Data Paper, supra note 3, where it indicates that an
increase in credit card spending tends to cause an increase in total consumer credit.
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about 5% in Japan.12 Recognizing some ambiguity in the distinction between credit cards
and debit cards for this purpose, Figure Six displays a parallel calculation of credit card
debt to total card value. Even on that broader calculation, the USA and the UK stand
alone with the broad use of cards as a borrowing vehicle.
FIGURE FIVE
CREDIT CARD DEBT/CREDIT CARD VOLUME (2001)
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FIGURE SIX
CREDIT CARD DEBT/CARD VALUE (2001)
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Looking more broadly at the economy, it also is important to get a sense for the

12

Media often assess this concern by reporting the share of cardholders that
“consistently” pay off their bills each month. As of the end of 2003, that metric was at 38.30 for
bank-issued credit cards in the United States. It rose steadily from 28.60 in 1990 to 44.4 in 2000,
but has fallen each of the last three years. See CardData, Bank Credit Card Convenience Usage –
Current, available at http://www.cardweb.com/carddata/charts/convenience_usage.amp (last
visited Dec. 20, 2004) (subscription required). Aside from the difficulty of knowing precisely
what that means, it is not possible to obtain that statistic for any country other than the United
States. The metric reported in the text is one that I can calculate readily for other countries.
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relation between credit card debt and other forms of non-mortgage consumer credit.
Thus, as of 2002, credit card debt in the United States was about 40% of all nonmortgage consumer credit, while in other high credit card usage countries like the UK,
Australia, and Canada the share ranged from 20% - 30%.13
B.

Explaining theUsagePatterns

There are many reasons that countries have different uses of cards as opposed to
other payment systems and debit cards as opposed to credit cards. Among other things,
the specific level of usage in any particular country is likely to be influenced at least in
part by the functionality of other payment products, the interplay among legal rules that
foster or retard card usage, demographic trends, cultural norms that support or inhibit the
practice of using cards, and more general institutional factors that facilitate or block the
development of a robust card market. In the end, however, it appears that a great deal of
the current pattern has nothing to do with those factors.14
I believe that the best explanation of the current pattern of card usage is a pathdependent one. The basic outlines of the current pattern of card usage depend to a
substantial degree on fortuitous events that occurred decades ago, at the time the credit
card product first came to prominence in the USA. To explain that perspective, I
summarize the path by which the modern payment card products have developed. In
doing so, I draw heavily on the excellent historical work of a number of scholars who
have studied this subject before.15 My contribution here is to put the specific historical
events in a broader global frame. This discussion emphasizes those features of the
American story that differentiate the USA from other countries, and thus helps to explain
the different paths other countries have taken.
In general, I see three major stages in the development of modern card products.
The first stage was the successful deployment of payment cards without the significant
extension of credit. The second was the successful development by financial institutions
of the revolving credit product that historically has been the principal basis of the card’s
13

The media and various central banks often report various other measures of borrowing
to emphasize different characteristics of the debt problem. Thus, the Bank of England reported in
2004 that overall household debt topped one trillion pounds and that the average person in the UK
now owes more, as a percentage of income, then in any other large industrialized country. See
http://www.iht.com/articles/532612.html.
14

This is not to say that those factors do not have great explanatory power for predicting
the potential size of the credit card market in different countries. It is just to say that the current
relative patterns of usage are largely unaffected by those relatively static explanations.
15

The best general account certainly is LEWIS MANDELL: THE CREDIT CARD INDUSTRY:
A HISTORY (1990). Other general accounts of note are DAVID EVANS & RICHARD
SCHMALENSEE, PAYING WITH PLASTIC: THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION IN BUYING AND BORROWING
(2d ed. 2004); ROBERT D. MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION: THE CONSEQUENCES OF
AMERICA’S ADDICTION TO CREDIT (2000); GEORGE RITZER, EXPRESSING AMERICA: A
CRITIQUE OF THE GLOBAL CREDIT CARD SOCIETY (1995).
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profitability. Networks and issuers have deployed the profits from that product to
provide the incentives that have led merchants and consumers to use the credit card with
increasing frequency. Finally, in the third stage, the availability of point-of-service
(POS) personal identification number (PIN) technology has made a sophisticated debit
card product feasible. The development of that technology has resulted in the rapid
growth of that product. The growth of the debit card, in turn, is both lessening the
relevance of credit in those countries where it is important and limiting its rise in
countries where it has never been important. The section closes with a discussion of the
fourth stage of the credit card, which is only beginning. In that stage, I argue, the
pressures of globalization will operate to force a substantial convergence of patterns of
usage, except in countries where substantial regulatory and institutional obstacles can be
brought to bear to limit the convergence. {The policy reforms discussed in Part III, of
course, provide a catalogue of potentially effective obstacles.}
1. The Payment Card
Credit cards as we know them today were introduced in the USA in the 1950s.
The first product was the Diner’s Club card. It functioned much like the product we
would now call a travel and entertainment card or a charge card.16 It was marketed to
high-salaried business travelers, and responded to a specific problem with the checking
system as it functioned in the U.S. at the time.
Specifically, the business traveler needed some way to pay remote merchants for
food and lodging without having to carry large sums of cash. Merchants were reluctant
to accept non-local checks, because it was difficult for them to make an informed
assessment of the likelihood that the traveler’s bank would honor the checks. The
problems of creditworthiness were aggravated by the long clearance times prevalent for
non-local checks before the Expedited Funds Availability Act.17
As a response to that problem, the payment card was a brilliant invention. For the
first time, bills from diverse places such as hotels, restaurants and airlines were
consolidated, reimbursed by the issuer, and then billed to the customer to be repaid in full
the next month. Among other things, this placed the billing function in the hands of an
intermediary, so that alternative payment devices were unnecessary and the restaurant did
not have to extend “credit” by invoicing a customer directly. Before that time only oil
companies and department stores had issued cards; those cards had a limited impact on
the overall pattern of consumer activity because they were accepted only at locations
affiliated with the issuer, in a limited geographic area.

16

MATTY SIMMONS, THE CREDIT CARD CATASTROPHE (1995) provides a particularly
entertaining insider’s account of the origin of the Diners Club card.
17

Until Congress’s 1987 enactment of the Expedited Funds Availability Act, 12 U.S.C.
§§ 4001-4010, “the check-clearing process too often lagged, taking days or even weeks to
complete.” Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 266 (1996).
For a brief discussion of that statute, see RONALD J. MANN, PAYMENT SYSTEMS (2d ed. 2003)
[hereinafter MANN, PAYMENT SYSTEMS].
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Still, the complex structure of the market for payment products made it doubtful
that the payment card would succeed. The problem is that payment cards are subject to
“network” or “bandwagon” effects – so that cards are more valuable to each person in the
system when the number of people using and accepting them grows. The problem is
exacerbated for payment cards because the system depends on the participation of three
separate groups: issuers, users, and merchants. Thus, however much Diners Club wanted
to deploy the technology, it could not make the product successful without persuading a
critical mass of users and merchants to use and accept the product. Diners Club
succeeded because it inserted itself as the sole issuer and because it convinced a large
number of merchants and users to accept the product.18
Diners Club was able profit from the fees it charged to merchants for
guaranteeing payment by cardholders as long as it could hold its bad-debt losses and
overhead to seven percent of transactions (the amount it charged merchants in the early
days, having raised the charge from six percent shortly after the card was launched).
Similarly, customers wanted to use the cards because they paid little or nothing for doing
so – Diner’s Club instituted a $3 annual fee shortly after the system was launched to
weed out cardholders that were not active users – and because the cards made the process
of obtaining accommodations and other services in remote locations much simpler.
The value to merchants was more complicated, even debatable – presaging the
persistent conflict between merchants and issuers that has plagued the industry
periodically to the present day. Despite complaints about cost, many merchants in fact
were willing to accept the cards because the costs that they would pay to Diner’s Club
were at most about equal to the costs that they faced when they accepted checks. A
rational merchant would include in the costs of check acceptance not only delay in
payment, but also losses from nonpayment and the costs (including the indignity and
hassle) of credit assessment of their customers.19 The merchant’s costs also included, of
course, the profits lost when the merchant turned away a potential customer because it
decided not to accept a check and no other payment system was available. Looking
forward, that business model remained profitable and successful for decades, although
leadership quickly passed from Diner’s Club to the better capitalized hands of American
Express.20

18

The best sources for that period are MANDELL, supra note 15, and SIMMONS, supra

note 16.
19

As explained above, the merchant that accepts the credit card does not bear the risk of
nonpayment as it does when it accepts a check. For a general discussion, see Ronald J. Mann, A
Payments Policy for the Information Age, 93 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2005) [hereinafter Mann,
Payments Policy].
20

See PETER Z. GROSSMAN, AMERICAN EXPRESS: THE UNOFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE
PEOPLE WHO BUILT THE GREAT FINANCIAL EMPIRE (1987); MANDELL, supra note 15;
SIMMONS, supra note 16.
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In context, the most important aspect of that business model is that it depended
directly on two features of the USA economy that were not common elsewhere. The first
is the significant amount of remote business travel. The relatively large geographic size
of the USA afforded greater opportunity for lengthy cross-country business trips than in
many other civilized countries. Similarly, the rise of the interstate highway system and
the postwar economic boom of the 1950’s fueled a large number of business travelers at
distances remote from their homes. The second factor relates to the USA banking
market. Although the interstate highway system fostered an unusually integrated
economy, the banking market through which checks were processed was not integrated.
The US banking industry by comparison to the banking industries of other countries was
highly fragmented. In 1952, for example, about the time of the invention of the credit
card, the US was home to 14,000 commercial banks.21
As Mark Roe explains, the geographic fragmentation of the industry rests directly
on this country’s persistent populist suspicion of large financial enterprises. The
regulatory system that governs financial enterprises in this country from the earliest days
has been structured to inhibit the growth of the large financial intermediaries that have
flourished for some time in England, Germany, and Japan.22 Extending Roe’s account
with respect to this issue, it is important to note that the fractionation of the payments
system is related to the WWI-era decision of the Federal Reserve to support the collection
of checks at par.23 Before intervention by the Federal Reserve, banks competed against
each other in the prices that they charged for collecting checks drawn in remote locations.
Had that competition continued unchecked, the obvious economies of scale involved in
that process probably would have led to considerable consolidation in the market for
check collection (as they did in England, where a single entity controls substantially all
check collection).24 But the intervention of the Federal Reserve provided long-distance
collection that at the time was essentially free. That action played a substantial role in the
rise of checks as a common payment system in this country, much more common than in
most of our trading partners. But it also limited the need for consolidation in the process,
thus contributing to the limited concentration of the banking entities that provided that
service to customers.
With 14,000 separate commercial banks, and in particular with large numbers of
small local banks that would have been eliminated without the support of deposit

21

See JOINT COMMITTEE ON CHECK COLLECTION SYSTEM, STUDY OF CHECK
COLLECTION SYSTEM (1954) (presented to American Bankers Association, Association of
Reserve City Bankers, and Conference of Presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks).
22

See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994).
23

See R. Alton Gilbert, The Advent of the Federal Reserve and the Efficiency of the
Payments Systems: The Collection of Checks, 1915-1930, 37 EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. HIST. 121
(2000).
24

That entity, “APACS,” is an association of the major depositary institutions. For
information, go to www.apacs.org.uk .
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insurance that the federal government instituted during the FDR era,25 it is inevitable that
a large portion of checks accepted by the types of merchants that deal with out-of-town
business travelers would be drawn on banks that did not have a presence in the area in
which the check was presented. The slow pace of clearance in the checking system
exacerbated the problem, making checks a generally unsatisfactory payment system for
those merchants.
Those factors are important in understanding the relatively early rise of payment
cards in the United States, because they help to explain why payment cards were not used
to any significant degree in any other country until much later. In other countries, it was
less likely that a business traveler wouldgo to a remote destination and use anything
other than cash as a payment system. And to the extent that they would, a concent rated
banking system predictably would lead – as in England – to procedures by which checks
readily could be accepted for such transactions throughout the country.
Thus, in England a check-guarantee scheme was introduced in 1969 to compete
with early British card products.26 The check-guarantee card solved the same problem as
the Diner’s Club card in this country, but did not lead to the early development of a
payment-card network.27 The key to that product was the concentrated banking system.
England has only a small number of significant banks (less than five at all relevant
times), all of whom have some market presence throughout the country. Thus, a business
traveler in a remote part of the country presenting a check for payment, backed by a
check guarantee card, had the benefit of a local bank assuring payment. Business
travelers in the USA have not had that kind of support for the acceptance of their
checks.28
2. Revolving Credit
Recognizing the potential for profiting from the issuance of payment cards, a
significant number of banks began to offer similar products in the 1960’s. Thus, Bank of
America created the BankAmericard in 1958, a product which eventually evolved into

25

For historical discussion that emphasizes the relative effects of deposit insurance on
different types of financial institutions, see HAROLD VAN B. CLEVELAND, CITIBANK: 1812-1970
(1986); JAMES GRANT, MONEY OF THE MIND: BORROWING AND LENDING IN AMERICA FROM
THE CIVIL WAR TO MICHAEL MILKEN (1992).
26

Payment cards have been available in Britain since 1951 when Donald McCullough
launched Finders Services after a trip to the United States. Finders Services merged with another
company to become Diner’s Club in 1962. American Express opened a service in Britain the
next year. See http://www.apacs.org.uk/downloads/History%20of%20cards%20FINAL.pdf.
27

The details of the rise of the check-guarantee card are based on interviews with UK
regulators and industry executives.
28

MANDELL, supra note 15, presents statistics on check guarantee cards in the USA and
on the failed efforts to push such a product in the USA.
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the Visa system. MasterCard was formed in 1966 when a group of credit-issuing banks
established MasterCharge.29
The banks soon transformed the product into a general-purpose payment card that
could be used to access a substantial line of revolving credit.30 Generally, the product
and its introduction combined three distinct features of existing markets. The first were
the proprietary “store” cards that large retailers had been issuing since the 1920’s as a
method for identifying customers with lines of credit – the most successful of which were
the dog-tag like “chargaplates” issued by New York department stores in the early postwar era.31 The second was the combination of the line of credit (something with which
banks were quite familiar) with the Diner’s Club product – a general-purpose card
accepted by merchants of various kinds in various locations. The third – the mechanism
for solving the initial startup problem – was the mass mailing, a technique used with
success by oil companies for their cards earlier in the century.32
The resulting product was quite distinct from the business model of the older
payment card. For the merchant, the cost in the early days was about the same. The
potential benefit, however, was greater than what the payment card could offer, because
the new card offered access to a new set of customers. As discussed above, the payment
card generally offered access to customers seeking the convenience of remote payment at
locations where checks might be difficult or cumbersome. A merchant that declined to
accept the Diner’s Club card had to fear that it would lose the potential profits from

29

MasterCard arose from a group of banks that feared the competitive ramifications of
joining a network dominated by Bank of America. The best sources on this subject are Timothy
Wolters, “Carry Your Credit in Your Pocket: The Early History of the Credit Card at Bank of
America and Chase Manhattan, 1 ENTERPRISE & SOCIETY 315 (2000), and DEE HOCK, BIRTH OF
THE CHAORDIC AGE (1999). Wolters provides a detailed history based on archival research of
early credit card programs at Chase Manhattan and Bank of America. Hock, the original founder
of Visa, provides an insider’s account of Visa’s founding and its early conflicts with MasterCard.
For present purposes, the key point in that development was the decision of the government in the
1970’s not to permit Visa to exclude MasterCard members. Hock argues that this decision, which
effectively prevented the creation of truly separate card networks, has been the root cause of the
competitive problems that plague the industry today. For a more sympathetic view of the effect
of that decision on the competitive landscape, see EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 15. On
that point, it is worth noting the considerably more competitive landscape that arose in Canada,
where antitrust litigation reached an opposite outcome, permitting the two networks to require
banks to become exclusive members of one or the other.
30

See ROBERT HENDRICKSON, THE CASHLESS SOCIETY (1972). The idea was not a
major leap. Rather, it was the kind of creative recombination of existing technologies that is
characteristic of so many successful inventions.
See ANDREW HARGADON, HOW
BREAKTHROUGHS HAPPEN: THE SURPRISING TRUTH ABOUT HOW COMPANIES INNOVATE
(2003).
31

See MANDELL, supra note 15; GRANT, supra note 25.

32

See MANDELL, supra note 15.
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business travelers that might choose to patronize establishments that would honor the
Diner’s Club card. The new credit card, however, offered access to customers that want
to use the convenience of installment credit for their purchases.
Thus, the card interacted with the existing infrastructure for consumer credit,
which by that time already was a major part of the American economy.33 As Figure
Seven illustrates, even before the introduction of the credit card, Americans were
borrowing substantial amounts on an annual basis. The ability to sell on credit while
“outsourcing” the credit functions to a general-purpose credit card issuer was a major
benefit to a retailer that was not large enough profitably to operate a credit program of its
own.34
FIGURE SEVEN: USA NONMORTGAGE CONSUMER CREDIT (TIME SERIES)
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Source: Federal Reserve Statistical Release G.19.
For the same reasons, the card had the potential to be attractive to a new group of
customers, for whom the Diner’s Club product was not useful. Specifically, as consumer
credit became a greater part of American culture, a substantial majority of Americans
became potential customers for a product that offers the ease of instant credit at the point
of sale whereas the Diner’s Club product was aimed at high-salaried business travelers.
The more difficult problem was how banks could profit from this product. In
theory, the banks that issued the cards could profit by charging merchant fees that would

33

See Wolters, supra note 29. The ability to offer installment credit has been a major
competitive attribute of United States merchants for the greater part of this century. See LENDOL
CALDER, FINANCING THE AMERICAN DREAM: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF SECURED CREDIT
(1999); MARTHA OLNEY, BUY NOW, PAY LATER: ADVERTISING, CREDIT AND CONSUMER
DURABLES IN THE 1920’S (1991).
34

See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 15. Banks, of course, by this time had much
more experience with installment credit than even large retailers. See CLEVELAND, supra note
25; GRANT, supra note 25; Wolters, supra note 29.
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offset ordinary administrative costs and interest rates that would compensate for the cost
of funds and the risk of nonpayment. In reality, even with the 18% interest rates that
were typical, it was difficult for issuers to profit in the early days. It is clear, for example,
that most of the issuers who started in the early 1950’s left the field promptly.35 Chase,
for example, quit the field after a massive investment, based on a rational determination
that it could not become profitable sufficiently quickly to justify continued investment.36
Among other things, the massive economies of scale in the early days made it
tremendously difficult for all but the very largest banks to succeed.37
One important part of that phase is that the depositary relations banks had with
their customers gave banks an advantage in assessing the creditworthiness of potential
cardholders. In the absence of the information or technology for any more sophisticated
assessment of creditworthiness than the information readily available from the depositary
relationship, non-bank entities (such as Diners Club and American Express) were not
able to compete in that market.38 Similarly, in countries where banks were not permitted
to issue cards (Japan being the obvious example), the arrival of the credit card market
was delayed by decades.39 Thus, although the Sumitomo Mitsui card was introduced in
1968 under license from the Bank of America,40 regulatory constraints that prevented the
issuer of that card from extending revolving credit to its users circumscribed the potential
growth and profitability of that card for decades.41
During the next three decades (from about 1965 to 1995), the revolving credit
product became the dominant card product in North America and began to spread rapidly
into many other countries. In the UK, for example, Barclays introduced a credit card
styled on the BankAmericard in 1966. Despite the early unprofitability of American
credit card operations, Barclays believed that it had the infrastructure in place to profit
immediately, largely because of its nationwide presence. Nevertheless, credit restrictions
imposed by the Bank of England stunted the card’s early growth, and the Barclaycard
operation was not profitable until 1972. Barclays’ competitors responded by introducing
the check guarantee system in 1969, hoping to curtail the growing popularity of the

35

See HOCK, supra note 29; MANDELL, supra note 15; Wolters, supra note 29.

36

See Wolters, supra note 29. As Wolters shows, the determination by Chase that its
program was less profitable than the parallel and competing Bank of America program rested in
part on Chase’s more accurate accounting system.
37

See MANDELL, supra note 15; MANNING, supra note 15; WOLTERS, supra note 29.

38

See SIMMONS, supra note 16; JON FRIEDMAN & JOHN MEEHAN, HOUSE OF CARDS:
INSIDE THE TROUBLED EMPIRE OF AMERICAN EXPRESS (1992).
39

See Ronald J. Mann, Credit Cards and Debit Cards in the United States and Japan, 55
VAND. L. REV. 1055 (2002) [hereinafter Mann, Japanese Cards].
40

See http://www.smfg.co.jp/english/aboutus/profile/history/smbc_card.html; HOCK,
supra note 29.
41

See Mann, Japanese Cards, supra note 39.
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Barclaycard as a payment device. Faced with the growing market share of the
BarclayCard, however, two of its largest competitors – Lloyds Midland and National
Westminster – launched the rival Access card in 1972, which was linked to MasterCard
two years later.42
Collectively, as Figure Eight shows, that history suggests that a variety of creditrelated regulatory obstacles slowed growth in those other countries so that transaction
volume on plastic cards as late as 1992 (the earliest year I can get data for a substantial
group of countries) remained quite small, even in the UK.
FIGURE EIGHT: CARD TRANSACTIONS PER CAPITA (1992)
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Another important aspect of this story is the level of concentration in the banking
industry. The contrast between the market in the US, on the one hand, and France, the
UK and Japan, on the other – provides considerable support for the idea that
concentration in a country’s banking industry slows financial innovation and
diversification.43 This is in part because a highly concentrated industry does not
experience the high costs of settling transactions that the fractionated industry in the
United States experienced, which is a powerful motivator for some type of payment
system that can be cleared and settled electronically. There also, however, is a sense that
highly concentrated industries are more likely to settle into comfortable patterns of
oligopolistic cooperation, in which the disruptive effects of innovative payment products
will be delayed. I have explained in previous writing, for example, the comfortable

42

See MARGARET ACKRILL & LESLIE HANNAH, BARCLAY’S: THE BUSINESS OF
BANKING 1690-1996 (2001).
43

Germany may provide a counterexample, because it has both the most fragmented
banking industry in the EU and at the same time one of the most underused credit card markets. I
need to do more work to understand the situation in Germany, but I believe that consumer credit
regulations in Germany made revolving credit products even less practical than in the UK and
Canada, where those restrictions were quickly loosened to permit at least some borrowing on
cards at an early date.
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assumption of large Japanese banks that their customers just don’t want access to easy
revolving credit, an assumption belied by the success of recently introduced Americanstyle card products.44 That also plainly seems to be the case in France, where the
coalition of banks in the Bankes Cartaire group apparently has worked hard to prevent
disruptive outside entry. Indeed, their successful efforts to exclude the British avant
garde issuer Egg seem to be one of the principal motivators of the recent action by the
European Commission charging that group with anticompetitive conduct.45 Even in the
UK, interviews suggest that the rapid changes in the market in recent years are largely
attributable to the entry of competitors from the US, which have introduced products that
UK banks easily could have introduced years ago.46
Moving closer to the present, two related institutional factors have been central
both to the success of the product in the United States and to its spread overseas. The
first was the rise of national credit sharing bureaus, which gave lenders much more
extensive information about potential cardholders – not only negative information about
defaults and arrearages, but also positive information that helped lenders to make
sophisticated determinations about the likely performance of potential cardholders.47
Those bureaus were formed in the 1950’s, shortly before credit cards first appeared in the
American market.48
The second development, closely related to the first, was the rapid development in
the field of computerized information processing. Credit cards depend on that
technology in a variety of ways. First, advances in information technology make

44

See Mann, Japanese Cards, supra note 39.

45

See Matt Ablott, French Banks Accused of Cards Cartel Carve-up, CARDS
INTERNATIONAL, Issue 322 (2004), at 3.
46

Press reports suggest similar effects in Belgium, Portugal, and Slovenia. In Belgium, a
consortium of local banks (the Bank Card Company) includes all card issuers other than Citibank,
a structure that “has certainly stifled competition in the Belgian market, with almost no promotion
of revolving credit products.” Debit Cards Dominate Belgian Market, CARDS INTERNATIONAL,
Issue 299 (2003), at 17 [hereinafter Belgian Debit Cards]. In Portugal, press reports attribute the
low rate of revolving credit to this fact: “[B]anks’ card strategies have been defined by wide-scale
co-operation, which, although facilitating technological development, has somewhat discouraged
innovation.” Portugal Offers Growth Potential, CARDS INTERNATIONAL, Issue 322 (2004), at 20
[hereinafter Portuguese Potential]. For Slovenia, card issuance is quite high (more than 1.5
payment cards per capita as of 2003), but very little use of them for revolving credit in a highly
regulated market dominated by two local issuers with no foreign competition. See Slovenia – A
Small Market with Big Potential, CARDS INTERNATIONAL, Issue 328 (2004), at 12.
47

See Robert J. Hunt, The Development and Regulation of Consumer Credit Reporting in
America (Fed. Res. Bank of Phil. Working Paper 02-21) (Nov. 2002).
48

See Marco Pagano & Tullio Jappelli, Information Sharing in Credit Markets, 48 J. FIN.
1693 (1993) (discussing the rise of credit bureaus without making any link to credit cards).
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processing of the underlying payment transactions immensely more efficient.49
Increasingly over the last twenty years, credit card transactions have been processed
electronically. Thus, only a small percentage of credit card transactions in the United
States now involve paper slips. While the checking process struggles to replace 5% of its
transactions with electronic processing, the credit card has much more rapidly become
almost entirely electronic. The industry as a whole and Visa50 in particular has shown
great nimbleness in moving so rapidly to electronic processing.
The central technological advance was the development of the magnetic stripe.51
The manufacturer of the card embosses the account number and accountholder’s name on
the front of the card and encodes the account number on the magnetic stripe on the back
of the card.52 To make counterfeiting more difficult, the major networks also in recent
years have included certain additional information on the back of the card that is not
visible on the front of the card (a card verification value or card verification code). The
advantage of the magnetic coding is that the information identifying the account can be
read electronically and transmitted to the issuer for collection. Older embossed cards
might produce slips with OCR characters that would be machine-readable for processing,
but the numbers could not be read electronically to facilitate an electronic transaction.53
Thus, the advent of the magnetic stripe freed the payment card from any requirement of
paper processing. From that point on, it was inevitable that the costs of processing card
transactions would fall steadily with advances in information and telecommunications
technology, while the costs of processing older paper-based transactions (those involving
checks or currency) would fall, if at all, much more slowly.
The ability to transmit information also makes the payment card cheaper in the
sense that transactions are inherently safer than paper-based transactions. Because the
information on the card can be read electronically, the system can verify the authenticity
of the card in “real time.” The terminal that reads the information off of the card
transmits that information to the issuer while the customer is at the counter, so that the

49

For example, we have come a long way from the days in which credit card transactions
depended on the processing and settlement of paper slips. See SIMMONS, supra note 16; HOCK,
supra note 29.
50

HOCK, supra note 29, provides an impressive explanation of the risks Visa took and the
difficulties it overcame in designing the first electronic transaction settlement system.
51

This discussion relies heavily on MANDELL, supra note 15.

52

For details on the meaning of the digits in the account number, go to
http://money.howstuffworks.com/credit-card2.htm (last visited December 29, 2004).
53

The technological challenge is underscored by the abject failure of the competing
Citibank effort, which resulted in a famous incident in which Citibank’s prototype processing
machine was thrown into the water just off of Manhattan. See MANDELL, supra note 15;
CLEVELAND, supra note 25; PHILIP L. ZWEIG, WRISTON: WALTER WRISTON, CITIBANK, AND
THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN FINANCIAL SUPREMACY (1995).
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issuer can decide whether to authorize transactions.54 Although that system certainly is
not impervious to fraud, it plainly is more efficient than the checking system, which relies
for verification primarily on a manual signature or presentation of a photo-bearing
identification card. To be sure, the system depends on a reliable and inexpensive
telecommunications infrastructure, but this country has had such an infrastructure
throughout the relevant time period.55
Developments in information technology also have made the credit card as a
lending vehicle immensely more efficient. Again, the basic distinction is one of
transaction costs. The most obvious advance relates to underwriting costs – the ability to
assess risks accurately. Software products allow lenders to analyze credit information in
increasingly sophisticated ways, culminating in the credit scoring products that dominate
modern consumer credit underwriting.56 One recent Federal Reserve researcher, for
example, estimated that automated credit assessment through credit scoring reduced bank
loan losses on consumer credit by $5 billion per year.57 Thus, part of the story plainly is
that the credit card has succeeded because it is a markedly efficient lending vehicle.58
The importance of information technology to a modern credit card program has
substantially altered the competitive landscape of the issuing process. In a system where
a depositary bank is the only entity that profitably can issue a credit card, there is little
competition on the terms on which the card is to be issued: the cardholder will use the
card if the terms on which his bank offers the card make it valuable for him to do so.
However, where a bank’s ability to offer profitable card products depends on its
information technology more than its depositary relationships, any bank can compete for

54

The numbers on the card facilitate autonomous routing of the transaction from the
merchant to its acquirer to the issuer of the agent that authorizes transactions.
55

Countries without such an infrastructure have been pressed by fraud problems to move
much more rapidly than the USA to adopt smart card technology, such as the chip-and-pin
initiative in the UK and the EMV initiative pressed more broadly by MasterCard and Visa. Those
technologies generally make it more feasible to assess the security of the transaction without as
much reliance on real-time telecommunications connection as the USA system. The adoption of
those systems might leave the USA as the country most vulnerable to fraud, which in turn would
lead to the adoption of similar systems here.
56

The difficulty of profiting in the early days of the credit card was directly related to the
primitive state of information technology at the time. See HOCK, supra note 29; Melina Lee
Suping & Huang Danwei, Plastic Money (Oct. 2002 manuscript) (discussing rise of the magnetic
stripe).
57

See Hunt, supra note 47. That result is consistent with typical models of screening
costs in the consumer credit industry, such as Fahad Khalil & Bruno M. Parigi, Screening,
Monitoring and Consumer Credit (Oct. 2001).
58

As Dagobert L. Brito & Per R. Hartley, Consumer Rationality and Credit Cards, 103 J.
POL. ECON. 400 (1995), points out, the advantage of the credit card is not limited to the
underwriting savings; the open-ended credit card loan also costs much less for the typical
borrower to obtain and access.
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the customer’s business. Thus, we see in the United States the rise of monoline banks –
banks without substantial depositary businesses that focus primarily on the credit card
market. The competition that they bring to the card market is so pervasive that by the late
1990’s more than 80% of active credit card accounts in the United States were with banks
that do not have a depositary relationship with the customer.59
That understanding of the American market has profound implications for the rise
of credit card markets in other countries, because many other countries have impediments
that prevent their market from developing along that path. As mentioned above, Japan
for decades prevented banks from being involved with revolving credit card products,
which helped to stifle any substantial credit card market until the early 1990’s when those
restrictions began to be repealed. Japan is marked even to this day by a stunted revolving
credit market. In Japan, every card is tied to a specific deposit account. When you
purchase with a credit card, the system operates on the assumption that you will pay for
the first transaction in the first billing cycle (“ikkai barai”). If you do not change that
assumption, payment for your purchases will be debited from your account automatically
once a month, in much the same way that we can arrange to have recurring payments
taken automatically from our accounts. If you do not want to have payment for the
purchase taken from your account in that way, you have to orally request a different
payment plan, essentially advising the retail clerk and any customers who happen to be
nearby that you do not plan to pay off your credit card bill the next month.60 It is not
surprising that the public assertion of borrowing required to take advantage of Japanese
revolving credit has not been common.61
A more common obstacle relates to the information on which banks rely for
accurate underwriting. The bank’s use of that information is profoundly offensive to the
privacy customs in most of the developed world – particularly mainland Europe. Thus,
although the Fair Credit Reporting Act might be a high point in the largely ineffectual
protections American law provides for personal data,62 that statute provides much less
protection than the European Data Privacy Directive, to which all countries in the
European Union are obligated to conform.63 Under that Directive, the storage and

59

See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 15.

60

Another debilitating feature of Japanese revolving credit is that you must select from a
menu of repayment schedules while at the counter. Typically, you could agree to pay for the
transaction in 2, 3, 4, 5, or 10 months, or from your next annual bonus. See Mann, Japanese
Cards, supra note 39. Although that menu is a long one, it does not provide the flexibility
American cardholders have, to pay each month for whatever share of the transaction appears best
at the time.
61

See Mann, Japanese Cards, supra note 39.

62

For a discussion of how American issuers use data for marketing, see BILL GRADY,
CREDIT CARD MARKETING (1992). For an early recognition of the privacy problems that this
raises, see HENDRICKSON, supra note 30.
63

See MANN & WINN, supra note 8.
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transmission of identifiable credit information to third parties without the specific
knowledge and consent of the customer would be plainly illegal.64 Hence, in countries
adhering to such a regime, it is not possible for a lender to obtain the kind of broadranging positive and negative information on which American-style credit scoring
depends.65 If the absence of such information would have the negative effects on the
profitability of the American industry that observers suggest,66 it is easy to see how great
an obstacle the general absence of such information poses to the expansion of the credit
card in those countries. Empirical work by European academics finds a strong causal
connection: the inability of lenders to obtain both positive and negative information about
borrowers appears to correlate with smaller consumer lending markets.67 It is of course
not clear which phenomenon would cause the other, but it does seem fair to say that the
use of credit cards in the continental EU is quite low.
The significantly higher rate of card use in the UK – despite the formal adherence
to the same directive – is doubtless attributable at least in part to the UK’s willingness to
tolerate a complicated system that allows credit card issuers to work around the
constraints of the Directive.68 The issue has come to the fore in the EU in the last few
years, as proposed revisions to the European Consumer Credit Directive would make it
all but impossible for monoline issuers to operate in Europe.69 Among other things, that
directive would require personalized counseling about the pros and cons of various
lending products that is antithetical to the lean staffing traditional for a successful
64

See Data Protection Directive arts. 7, 15. Those provisions are implemented into law
in the UK in the Data Protection Act, §§ 4 (and Schedule 1), 11.
65

See Nicola Jentzsch, The Economics and Regulation of Financial Privacy – A
Comparative Analysis of the United States and Europe (JFK Working Paper No. 128/2001).
66

See Hunt, supra note 47.

67

See Tullio Jappelli and Marco Pagano, Information Sharing in Credit Markets: A
Survey (Centre for Studies in Economics and Financing Working Paper No. 36) (March 2000);
Tullio Jappelli & Marco Pagano, Information Sharing, Lending and Defaults: Cross Country
Evidence (CSEF Working Paper No. 22) (Mar. 2000); Nicola Jentzsch, The Implications of the
New Consumer Credit Directive for EU Credit Market Integration (2003 draft); Nicola Jentzsch
& Amparo San Jose Riestra, Information Sharing and Its Implications for Consumer Credit
Markets: United States v. Europe (May 2003 draft); Jorge A. Padilla & Marco Pagano, Sharing
Default Information as a Borrower Discipline Device (1999 draft) (forthcoming in EUROPEAN
ECON. REV.).
68

Under that system, credit bureaus permit issuers to evaluate files of individuals stripped
of identifying information. After the issuers determine which files reflect credit histories suitable
for their marketing, the issuers can send solicitations to the individuals reflected in those files.
Interview with Experian’s Bureau in the UK. The legal environment for a similar system
apparently exists in Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands, but not elsewhere in the EU. See
Overindebtedness in the Enlarged EU, CARDS INTERNATIONAL, Issue 319 (2004), at 20.
69

See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
Harmonization of the Law, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States
Concerning Credit for Consumers, COM (2002) 443 (Sept. 11, 2002).
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monoline bank.70 As discussed above, regulations that make it difficult for monoline
issuers to operate are likely to have the inevitable effect of stifling innovation by limiting
competition so that for most cardholders the only plausible issuer is the bank at which the
cardholder maintains the primary deposit account. That is particularly important in the
UK, where the advent of American monoline issuers in the late 1990’s seems to be
connected with the recent growth of credit card spending and debt.71
To illustrate that point, consider the cautionary tale of South Korea. Issuers in
that country recently have engaged in heavy marketing and issuance of revolving credit
cards, despite the absence of the kind of credit-assessment system customary in the
United States. At first, those efforts were successful, as shown by the rapid increase in
credit card spending displayed in Figure Nine.

70

Article 6.3 of the proposed Directive would require lenders to provide advice to
customers about the proper product for the customer’s particular use. That requirement would be
burdensome for credit cards generally because of the difficulty of predicting at the time of the
application how the card ultimately will be used. It would be particularly difficult for monoline
issuers that do not ordinarily maintain staff to engage in personalized discussions with each
customer. For a general discussion from the perspective of the industry, see APACS, The
Proposed Consumer Credit Directive (Com (2002) 443) & Its Potential Consequences for the UK
Credit Card Market (Apr. 23, 2003).
71

This discussion draws on interviews with British credit card executives.
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FIGURE NINE
CREDIT CARD SPENDING/GDP
(SOUTH KOREA TIME SERIES)
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Those transactions also, however, led to an unnatural increase in the volume of
credit card lending, as shown in Figure Ten. The consequence of lending without
appropriate information, unfortunately, is an unacceptable rate of defaults. In the case of
South Korea, it led in 2003 to delinquencies by twelve million cardholders (in a country
with a population of less than 50 million), approximately 30% of all households.72 Those
delinquencies eventually required a $4 billion government bailout of the major credit card
issuers.73 Only after the crisis have issuers had access to positive (“white”) data as a tool
to assess the creditworthiness of potential cardholders.74

72

See The Korea Credit Card Meltdown – What Happened and What Lessons Are
Relevant?, CARDS International, Issue 318 (2004), at 13; Korean Card Company Blacklist
Reaches 3m, CARDS INTERNATIONAL, Issue 297 (2003), at 11 [hereinafter Korean Card
Blacklist].
73

See Korean Rescue Programmes Unveiled, CARDS INTERNATIONAL, Issue 298 (2003),
at 23; Korean Card Blacklist, supra note 72; Investors Nervous over South Korean Card Debts,
CARDS INTERNATIONAL, Issue 296 (2003), at 11; South Korea Takes Action over Credit Debt
Crisis, CARDS INTERNATIONAL, Issue 294/295 (2003), at 9 [hereinafter South Korean Action].
74

See Regulators Tighten South Korea’s Belt, CARDS INTERNATIONAL, Issue 290 (2003);
see also Taiwan Takes Action over Credit Crunch Fears, CARDS INTERNATIONAL, Issue 319
(2004), at 9 (attributing stability of Taiwanese market, as compared to Korean market, to
capabilities of national credit bureau).
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FIGURE TEN
CREDIT CARD DEBT/GDP
(SOUTH KOREA TIME SERIES)
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3. Point-of-Sale Debit
The most prominent trend of the last ten years has been the rapid rise of the debit
card, which threatens to eclipse the credit card in its dominance of the industry. For
example, even in the USA – the great bastion of credit card borrowing – the share of
debit cards in all card transactions has risen significantly since the early 1990’s (Figure
Eleven).
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FIGURE ELEVEN
DEBIT CARD TRANSACTIONS/CARD TRANSACTIONS
(USA TIME SERIES)
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In some countries, that increase reflects the first major influx of card use. For
example, in the UK, Australia, and Canada card transactions per capita rose from about
30 in the early 1990’s to much larger numbers by the end of the decade (about 80 for the
UK and Australia, and 120 for Canada). Except for Australia (which I discuss below),
debit cards drove most of that growth. In countries in which the revolving credit model
described above never succeeded, technological advances offered a separate route to a
burgeoning card industry, leapfrogging the revolving credit stage. Here, the specific
infrastructure development was the continuing decline in the cost of POS terminals,
which has made it cost-effective in many countries for all but the smallest merchants to
accept debit cards at the POS.75 The business case for the card in that situation – typified
by the UK – was as a replacement for the check. Essentially, the debit card served as a

75

The introduction of debit cards had a significant impact on average transaction values,
because the average transaction values for debit cards traditionally are significantly lower than
those for credit cards, reflecting their roots as a product that substitutes for cash and checks.
Thus, for example, as of 2001 the average USA credit card transaction was $61, while the
average USA debit card transaction was $36. As the credit card market has matured, issuers have
searched for new revenue streams and increased transactions. Thus, issuers have strived to find
ways to encourage existing users to use credit cards for different types of transactions, including
both small value transactions and more routine transactions such as bill payment, groceries and
fast-food restaurants. Those newer transactions tend to be smaller value and thus to deflate the
average transaction value.
See http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A453932005Feb22.html; http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB110685605351138309-email,00.html.
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convenient vehicle for fostering a switch from expensive paper-based transactions to
cheaper electronic transactions.76
Canada is the most notable example of that trend: card transactions in Canada
have grown even more rapidly than in the USA, so that since 1998 there actually have
been more card transactions per capita in Canada than in the USA. As a latecomer to
those transactions, though, Canada has maintained a persistently low rate of borrowing in
its credit card transactions. Thus, the overall ratio of card debt to card value is now about
20%, roughly half the rate in the USA.
Similarly in the UK, the ready technological availability of the debit card in the
late 1990’s came shortly after the wide deployment of the revolving credit card in the
early 1990’s. As a result, British credit card debt as a share of card transactions began to
fall shortly after its appearance, resulting in a current market similar to Canada’s: a ratio
of card debt to card value of about 20% at the turn of the millennium.
Australia offers a slightly different example, because a disproportionately large
share of its growth has come from credit card transactions, rather than debit card
transactions. Australia is perhaps the only country in the world in which the relative
share of credit card transactions grew during the 1990’s. Nevertheless, even in Australia,
debit card transactions have grown rapidly, and the rate of borrowing on credit cards has
fallen steadily, so that the absolute share of debt as a portion of total card value has fallen
to about the same level in Australia as in the UK and Canada.
Finally, South Africa affords the example of a lesser-developed country.
Although South Africa has had a fully developed market for revolving credit on the cards
that its consumers have, it does not have the technological infrastructure necessary for
wide deployment of the technology necessary for a successful system of processing.
Accordingly, card use in South Africa remains quite low, about 3-4 transactions per year
per capita compared to more than a hundred per year per capita in the United States and
Canada.
The rise in use of the debit card is somewhat harder to understand in countries
like the USA, the only major country where the credit card was commonly used as a
payment device in the early 1990’s. {Refer again to Figure Eight.} In the USA, for
example, the debit card in many ways is inferior from the perspective of a hypothetical
rational consumer. For one thing, the consumer must pay for the purchase immediately,
without the flexibility and float that the revolving credit card provides. For another, the
consumer is much less likely to receive affinity benefits (particularly for PIN-based
products). Similarly, as discussed below, the marketing strategies of credit card issuers
suggest that those benefits attract a significant number of consumers.
Finally, the consumer receives fewer legal protections for problems with debit
transactions than it does for credit card transactions. In the USA, for example, the Truth

76

Interviews with British credit card executives and regulators.
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in Lending Act and the Electronic Funds Transfer Act provide protection for cardholders
against unauthorized transactions on credit or debit cards.77 The Truth in Lending Act
goes even further for credit cards, providing, among other things, a right to withhold
payment that allows the cardholder, in appropriate circumstances, to present against the
card issuer any defense that the cardholder had against the merchant.78 England79 and
Canada80 have similar though somewhat narrower protections for credit cards. Japan has
a somewhat similar, though even narrower, protection.81 None of those countries,
however, has substantial protections for debit cards.82
For several reasons, however, I doubt that the breadth of the legal protections
significantly influences choice among card-based payment systems, either in the USA or
elsewhere. First, the statutes can motivate consumer behavior only if consumers
understand the protections they afford. That seems most unlikely. Is it likely, for
example, that the average American consumer understands the difference in legal
protections that arises from the use of a debit card rather than a credit card?83 Second,
even if consumers in fact do understand the protections that the statutes afford, those
protections can motivate consumers only if consumers accurately weigh the risks when

77

TILA § 133; EFTA § 909; see Mann, Payments Policy, supra note 19.

78

TILA § 170. Thus, for example, if a cardholder purchases a book from an online
bookseller and the book never arrives, the cardholder is not obligated to pay the credit card bill
associated with that transaction; it is up to the issuer to recover from the bookseller. For careful
analysis of the details of those rules, see HOWARD STRONG, WHAT EVERY CREDIT CARD USER
NEEDS TO KNOW: HOW TO PROTECT YOURSELF AND YOUR MONEY (1999).
79

Section 75 of the Consumer Credit Act imposes liability on the issuer for defects in
goods and services purchased with a credit card (parallel to TILA § 170 in the United States.
Sections 83 and 84 limit the issuer’s ability to charge the customer for unauthorized transactions
(parallel to TILA § 133). See GRAHAM STEPHENSON, CREDIT, DEBIT & CHEQUE CARDS: LAW &
PRACTICE (1993).
80

Canada limits liability for $50 for unauthorized transactions that occur before
notification of the creditor, but does not protect telephone-order or Internet transactions at all.
Cost of Borrowing Regulations § 12; see Benjamin Geva, Consumer Liability in Unauthorized
Electronic Funds Transfers, 38 CANADIAN BUS. L.J.207 (2003).
81

Japan has a limited protection against unauthorized transactions (parallel to TILA §
133) in Article 30 of the Installment Sales Law [Kappu hanbaih ], Law No. 159 of 1961. That
law, however, only applies to kappu transactions; it excludes the overwhelming majority of
transactions that are accomplished through ikkai barai. See Mann, Japanese Cards, supra note
39.
82

Voluntary codes among banks in Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom provide
protection for unauthorized debit card transactions where the cardholder is not negligent, but
assign responsibility to negligent cardholders. See Geva, supra note 80; STEPHENSON, supra note
79.
83

This problem has gotten much more serious as multiple credit and debit functions have
begun to reside on a single card and as terminals progressively have lost the ability to accurately
interpret those functions. I address those problems in Mann, Payments Policy, supra note 19.
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they select a payment system. As I have discussed elsewhere, common behavioral biases
that limit rational consideration of uncommon unfortunate events suggest that for many
consumers those problems will not be given due weight.84 Third, even if consumers do
understand the statutes and do give due weight to them, in many cases the protections
would not affect their use of the card. Protections against unauthorized transactions, for
example, should not motivate card use if the use is one that is not likely to result in an
unauthorized transaction. For example, why would protections against unauthorized
credit card use motivate cardholders to use their card in an ordinary face-to-face
transaction? Perhaps, you could say, the statute allows the cardholder to overcome the
fear that the shopkeeper might be stealing the card number. For example, the handheld
wireless payment terminals common in Europe apparently are designed to assuage the
concerns of cardholders that a waiter might write down the cardholder’s card number if
the waiter took the card out of the cardholder’s sight. It is difficult to believe, however,
that a concern about that problem is driving the use of cards generally.
Those commonsense understandings are buttressed by the available empirical
evidence about use of cards, which does not seem to be influenced in any obvious way by
the extent of legal protections. For example, the statutory protections for credit card
transactions in the UK and Canada are relatively similar, while Australia has no similar
protections. Yet, the rates of credit card usage per capita are almost twice as high in
Australia and Canada as they are in the UK. Similarly, rates of credit card usage have
increased significantly over the last ten years in many countries, but none of those
countries recently has strengthened the statutory protections for credit cards in any
cognizable way. Finally, and most tellingly, the facts of debit card usage are profoundly
inconsistent with the hypothesis. The USA has by far the most effective consumer
protections for debit cards. Yet, debit cards in the USA have an unusually low share of
all card transactions, lower than their share in countries like Canada and the United
Kingdom, both of which have much more favorable protections for credit card
transactions than they do for debit card transactions.
Still, despite the apparent attractiveness of the credit card, it is easy to see strong
reasons for the rise in use of the debit card. First, even in the USA, a significant part of
the population does not have credit cards. Estimates vary widely, but about 25% of the
adult population does not have a credit card.85 Others may be facing binding credit
limits. For those individuals, debit cards are the only available payment card.86 Further,

84

See RICHARD H. THALER, QUASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS (1991); Mann, Payments
Policy, supra note 19.
85

See Demos, Borrowing to Make Ends Meet: The Growth of Credit Card Debt in the
90’s, available at http://www.demos-usa.org/demos/debt_assets/borrowing.pdf {This is based on
the SCF and thus might be quite inaccurate. The next draft will include some other estimates,
which often are considerably higher.}
86

Because of the well-developed subprime market in the USA, the number of people
excluded from the credit card market is much lower than in countries that have aggressive usury
laws.
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debit card users that have revolving credit balances might use debit cards to minimize
interest payments.
Another explanation looks more broadly at the payment systems market. Around
the world, there is a migration from paper-based forms of payment (including cash and
checks) to electronic forms of payment such as payment cards. From that perspective,
the appropriate comparison is not between the credit card and the debit card, but between
the debit card and the check in the USA.87 In the USA, the debit card has been
introduced as a close substitute for the check, allowing a purchaser to pay for goods by
authorizing his bank to disburse funds from a deposit account directly to the merchant.
The principal difference is that the customer makes the authorization electronically (with
the card) rather than by paper (with a check). The growth of debit cards in the USA
United States probably is best seen not as a shift from credit cards, but rather as the
growth of a new cards market by purchasers who are abandoning checks in favor of debit
cards. That explanation is supported by statistics on retail use of payment systems. As
Figure Twelve shows, that data indicate that the use of credit cards has remained more or
less constant at 16-18% of transactions since 1994. The growth of debit cards during that
same period from about 1% to 11% has closely matched a fall of checks from 36% to
23%.88

87

An interesting cross-current relates to the small but growing market for payments in
electronic commerce. As that segment of the market grows, we can expect the use of payment
cards to increase substantially except in those countries where electronic money products
succeed. In the USA, as it happens, debit cards have had relatively little online penetration to
date, largely because of the technological difficulties of online PIN authorization (a problem that
should not persist long). Thus, in the USA (which has the largest retail ecommerce market by
far), most of the non-credit card payment vehicles currently in broad use piggyback to some
degree on the credit card or directly on checking accounts. See Ronald J. Mann, Regulating
Internet Payment Intermediaries, 82 TEXAS L. REV. 681 (2004) [hereinafter Mann, Payment
Intermediaries].
88

See NILSON REPORT (Issue 799).
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FIGURE TWELVE
TRANSACTION SHARES OF
NONCASH CONSUMER PAYMENT SYSTEMS
(USA TIME SERIES)
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A more general explanation rests on standard types of quasi-rational behavior by
cardholders. Most obviously, some cardholders might prefer to use a debit card because
it provides a pre-commitment against spending in excess of a present income stream.89
Of course, a rational consumer could make the same purchases with a credit card and
gain the additional financial benefits that come with that product in the United States
market. Still, anecdotal evidence suggests that a desire to avoid the temptation of
borrowing is behind a significant part of the rise of the debit card in the United States.90
That story resonates strongly with the story about “budgetism” that Lendol Calder
famously uses to explain the attractiveness of consumer credit in the first instance in this
country.91
The discussion above helps to explain the unusual failure of the debit card in
Japan. Introduced with great fanfare in the spring of 2000, the product has not made any
significant progress in the market: the most recent statistics indicate far less than one
transaction per capita per year. Because Japan is a country in which cards are not used

89

See THALER, supra note 84.

90

The empirical evidence appears to be quite equivocal. See Jonathan Zinman, Why Use
Debit Instead of Credit? Consumer Choice in a Trillion Dollar Market (Fed. Res. Bank of New
York Staff Report No. 191) (July 2004).
91

See CALDER, supra note 33.
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for borrowing, the failure of the debit card at first puzzled me. Eventually I concluded
that it had failed for two reasons. First, unlike the UK and the Commonwealth countries
discussed above, there is no market impetus to promote debit cards to save the costs of
checks; Japanese consumers do not use checks.92 Nor is there any need to use the
product to precommit against borrowing.93 Japan’s odd credit card already had filled the
market niche for the debit card. The ikkai barai product discussed above provides
automatic payment from the account for all but the most inveterate of consumer
borrowers. That arrangement gives the precommitted cardholder enough support to
refrain from borrowing. Thus, if the market niche for the debit card rests on a fear of
borrowing coupled with a desire to precommit to avoid excessive borrowing, the existing
Japanese products already fill the niche adequately. From that perspective, the Japanese
debit card has failed because its marketers have failed to produce a business case that can
persuade cardholders to switch to the card.
Some academics have suggested that a country’s preference for cash might slow
the development of card-based payment systems, suggesting that payment card use in
general is less common in countries where public places are sufficiently safe to make
people feel secure in carrying large amounts of cash. This “fear-of-crime” hypothesis is
advanced to explain why cardholders in Japan use cards relatively little in their safe urban
environments, while cards are used much more commonly in the relatively unsafe United
States.94 It is also argued that recent growth of cards in Latin America can be explained
by the lack of safety in some Latin American countries.95 As an academic matter, this
hypothesis generally is associated with the work of David Humphrey, which often is
regarded as having proven the truth of this hypothesis.96
Several things make it difficult to test that thesis directly. First, because the thesis
relies on a perception of crime that makes individuals reluctant to carry cash, hard
statistical evidence about the frequency of crime cannot respond directly to the thesis.
Recent research by Sara Sun Beale underscores that point, showing that perceptions of
crime and safety are in major part constructed by the media without regard to the reality
of the underlying problems.97

92

See Mann, Japanese Cards, supra note 39.

93

I discuss the second explanation at length in Mann, Japanese Cards, supra note 39.

94

See Mann, Japanese Cards, supra note 39. The relation of cards to crime cuts in two
directions. As has long been recognized, the rise of card-based transactions makes possible new
and more serious financial crimes that were not possible in a paper-based payments system. See
HENDRICKSON, supra note 30.
95

See EUROMONITOR, WORLD MARKET FOR FINANCIAL CARDS (2002).

96

The key paper is David B. Humphrey, Lawrence B. Pulley & Jukka M. Vesala, 28 J.
MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 914 (1996).
97

See Sara Sun Beale, The Political, Social, Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors
Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFFALO CRIM. L. REV. 23 (1997);
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Second, it is difficult to disentangle that thesis from related cultural norms about
cash. For example, one reason people might pay with cash in some countries and credit
cards in others is the significance the payment system has as a status symbol. In the
United States, for example, credit card issuers have succeeded in creating a norm,
perhaps less powerful than it was once, that payment with a credit card is a sign of
status.98 Thus, a payment of $1000 for a restaurant bill in the United States surely would
appear suspicious, if not incriminating evidence of money laundering. In other countries
– Japan being the obvious case – payments with cash carry a similar status.99 Anecdotal
evidence in some sources suggests that a similar pattern might explain the duration of the
use of cash – and the related slow uptake of credit cards – in Italy100 and India.101 For
whatever reason, however, while that norm persists it is difficult to separate its effects on
card usage from the effects of crime.
Finally, the data available to compare crime rates in different countries are
problematic in a number of ways. First, they typically rely on police reports and thus
inevitably understate the true amount of crime. Thus, if the amount by which crime is
understated differs by country, then comparisons may be inaccurate.102 Second, because
the data depend on reports of local enforcement activity, they are based on local
definitions of the various crimes. Those definitions are likely to differ substantially from
country to country.103 Finally, it is not clear which types of crimes would be most likely
to support or undermine the insecurity thesis, because it is not clear what particular
crimes foster the feeling of insecurity that might make the consumer reluctant to carry
cash. On the one hand, property crimes would seem to relate most closely to the actual
risk created by carrying cash. On the other hand, violent crimes like murder are more
likely to be publicized in a way that would cause consumers to become insecure about
their overall safety.
In any event, it is not clear that Humphrey, Pulley & Vesala 1996 actually
supports the hypothesis. The first thing that is evident from a close reading of the paper

Sara Sun Beale, Economic Pressures and Internal Structure Shape the U.S. Media's Treatment of
Crime: Do They Also Shape U.S. Criminal Justice Policy? (Nov. 2001).
98

See MANDELL, supra note 15.

99

It may be that the duration of such a cash status norm in Japan has links to the
relatively large role in the Japanese economy of underreporting of income and the relative
significance of organized crime in Japan. See Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, The Dark Side
of Private Ordering: An Institutional and Empirical Analysis of Organized Crime, 67 U. CHI. L.
REV. 41 (2000).
100

See EUROMONITOR, supra note 95.

101

See India’s Banks Join the Party, CARDS INTERNATIONAL, Newsletter 483 (2002).

102

See GLOBAL REPORT ON CRIME AND JUSTICE (G. Newman ed. 1999) (noting that

problem).
103

See GLOBAL REPORT ON CRIME AND JUSTICE, supra note 102 (noting that problem).
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is that it does not identify the source of the crime data used in the regressions. More
importantly, it is evident from the tables in the paper that their statistical finding on this
point is not at all robust. Specifically, [the Durbin-Watson coefficients suggest an
unacceptably high degree of autocorrelation in the time series.]104
Against that background, I tried to replicate and update their study as best as I
could. It is still instructive to look at the available data, if only because data relevant to
the thesis are available. To that end, I collected data from Interpol about crimes in the
Group of Ten countries for which the Bank of International Settlements periodically
issues its so-called Red Book of payments statistics.105 I also collected from various
editions of the Red Book (which appears to be the source for the payment systems data in
Humphrey, Pulley & Vesala 1996) data on the use of various card and non card-based
payment systems over time. [Data analysis to come.]
*****
To summarize, the USA has a unique pattern of credit and debit card usage
because of the circumstances existing in the USA financial market in the early 1950’s.
The USA also is unique in having a large infrastructure of consumer credit by the end of
the 1950’s. Those features together made the USA better suited for the rapid uptake of
the credit card as a lending vehicle. Countries that adopted card products later fall into
three groups. The first group is developed economies that have not imposed substantial
barriers to card use. In those countries, debit cards tended to take root first, with
revolving credit growing during the 1990’s in absolute, but not relative, terms. The
examples here are places like the UK, Canada, and Australia. The second group is
developed economies that have imposed substantial barriers on credit card use; the result
there has been stunted use of cards and of revolving credit (as in Japan). The third group
is undeveloped countries, where the lack of infrastructure has made it impractical to have
deep market penetration of any type of card (as in the case of South Africa).
4.

Are Card Use Patterns Converging?

What do the coming decades hold for the credit and debit card? Although it is
difficult to predict with any certainty, two main features of the discussion above seem
likely to dominate the shifting pattern in the years to come: globalization and
information.
The first is the most obvious: the continuing pressures of the global economy will
create ever-more powerful forces toward the convergence of products and brands in the
developed economies. We see this already in a number of contexts. For example, the
source of the first American-style revolving credit card to be marketed in Japan was a
Japanese consumer-finance company that developed the product in a series of field visits
104

In defense of the authors, their paper does not itself present the hypothesis with great
vigor. [Add details]
105

For more details on the Red Book, see the Data Appendix.

35

Credit Card Policy

March 5, 2005 Draft

to the offices of American monoline issuers like Providian. Similarly, the rise of loyalty
cards and aggressive marketing in the UK and Ireland is commonly attributed, at least in
the popular media, to the entry of American competitors like MBNA.106 In the same
vein, it seems clear that Citibank will play a major role in the development of credit
products in numerous countries,107 the most important of which doubtless is mainland
China, a vast market which has seen the number of true credit cards quintuple between
2001 and 2004, with expectations of geometric growth continuing in the immediate
feature, as China enters the WTO in 2007 and hosts the Olympics in 2008.108 Indeed,
even in countries like Thailand that are trying to impose serious limits on consumer
credit, the companies that are developing the local market are American companies like
GECC.109
Much of the apparent differentiation in products reflects a McDonald’s like
phenomenon in which American products are cosmetically altered to suit local tastes – so
that local consumers can reassure themselves they are using a product reflecting their
unique heritage but retaining the underlying features that make the product profitable.110
106

See New Entrants Shake Up Irish Market, CARDS INTERNATIONAL, Issue 319 (2004),
at 23 (Ireland). Press accounts suggest a similar pattern in Belgium and in Portugal. In Belgium,
Citibank is both the only credit card issuer that is not part of the local consortium (Bank Card
Company) and also the first issuer of revolving credit cards. See Belgian Debit Cards, supra note
46. In Portugal, Citibank (along with the French Cetelem and the British Barclaycard) is one of
the major catalysts in developing a market stifled by local co-operation. See Portuguese
Potential, supra note 46. MBNA recently has begun operations in Spain, but it seems to be too
early to tell whether they will be as successful there. See Louise O’Mahony, Overseas Players
Eye Hot Spanish Market, CARDS INTERNATIONAL, Issue 298 (2003), at 17.
107

Press reports suggest that Citibank is particularly focused on introducing revolving
credit in countries where competing card issuers focus on cards only as a payment medium. This
tends to support a substantial increase in the number of cards, because it justifies cards as
profitable on their own, rather than as a convenience issued only to the top end of an institution’s
customers. See Cards Slowly Overcoming Barriers in Indonesia, CARDS INTERNATIONAL, Issue
316 (2004), at 19 [hereinafter Indonesian Cards Barriers] (discussing Citibank’s general business
model in Asia); Wayne Arnold, Boom Time for Credit in Southeast Asia, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12,
2004 (discussing Citibank’s success in Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia); Cards Jump on
Consumer Credit Bandwagon in Poland, CARDS INTERNATIONAL, Issue 296 (2003), at 19
(discussing Citibank’s business model in Poland).
108

See Culture Clash For Chinese Cards, CARDS INTERNATIONAL, Issue 325 (2004), at
2; Matt Ablott, Citibank’s Chinese Head-Start, CARDS INTERNATIONAL, Issue 298 (2003), at 10;
South Korean Action, supra note 73.
109
110

See Arnold, supra note 107.

For general discussion of that phenomenon under the name of “glocalization,” see
GEORGE RITZER, THE GLOBALIZATION OF NOTHING (2004). For a particularly entertaining
example, consider the kosher product recently introduced in Israel.
See
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull&cid=110601836374
9.
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The example that motivates this thought is Germany, where it is widely thought to be
impossible to succeed with a conventional American credit card product. At the same
time, however, German consumers seem to be willing to use check cards that include
overdraft protection, so that consumers at the point of sale can use plastic to make
purchases by borrowing funds from a financial institution that has agreed in advance to
make such a loan.111 For a similar development, consider the rise in recent years of
“Sharia-compliant” credit cards in the Middle East, which are marketed as offering the
benefits of American style credit cards while maintaining a technical compliance with
Islamic law.112 The distinctions between that card and a conventional credit card
doubtless are important for some purposes, but the product relies on the same features
that have made the American product successful.
Although it is plain that the branding and concept of an American-style credit
card is a prominent example of globalization, it is less clear (as the data described above
suggest) that widespread use of the revolving credit feature first introduced in America
has spread. Indeed, the most common explanation for limited use of credit cards is that
certain countries have cultural norms against borrowing, making the revolving credit
feature of the credit card unattractive. I encountered the “frugality” hypothesis while
studying the Japanese card market.113 It is not, however, limited to that market; observers
also attribute low rates of card use in southern Europe and the Netherlands to similar
norms.114 Under this view, the rise of credit cards can be attributed to the gradual
assimilation of a global norm that includes the prodigality characteristic of American
society.
The limited use of consumer credit in some countries reflects differences in the
receptivity of some cultures to borrowing. For example, the Islamic rules that forbid the
payment of interest surely have stifled the development of credit in countries like Saudi
Arabia and Indonesia.115 That is not to say that there is not now and never will be
consumer credit in countries with dominant Muslim populations.116 It is to say, however,
111

For a discussion of similar American programs that illuminates how similar they are to
conventional borrowing programs, see Marc Fusaro, Check Bouncing Goes Mainstream: An
Empirical Study of Bounce Protection Programs (unpublished Nov. 2003 manuscript).
112

See Adib Launches Credit Card that Complies with Sharia, GULF NEWS, Jul. 5, 2004,
available at www.zawya.com (last visited July 30, 2004) [hereinafter Adib’s Sharia Card].
113

See Mann, Japanese Cards, supra note 39.

114

EUROMONITOR, supra note 95, discusses southern Europe. Press reports tell a very
similar story in the Netherlands, where the low rate of revolving credit is attributed to a
“traditional Dutch aversion to credit.” Yet, as in Japan, local banks did not issue a revolving
credit card product until recently, and found it successful when it was issued. See Dutch Revolve,
But Not on Cards, CARDS INTERNATIONAL, Issue 318 (2004), at 24.
115

See EUROMONITOR, supra note 95 (discussing Saudi Arabia); Indonesian Cards
Barriers, supra note 108 (discussing Indonesia).
116

See Adib’s Sharia Card, supra note 112 (discussing “Sharia-compliant” credit card
issued in 2004 in Abu Dhabi); The Risk-Reward Challenge of Credit Cards in the Middle East,
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that the level of consumer borrowing in Saudi Arabia is relatively low for a country with
such a high level of economic development,117 and that sincerely held religious beliefs
seem to be a reasonable explanation for the relatively slow development of credit
institutions. As current events in that country suggest and as the argument in the
remainder of this article will make clear, however, in a short time – a matter of decades –
those obstacles are likely to dissipate118 and leave Saudi Arabia and similar countries119
with a rate of consumer borrowing commensurate with their developed status.
Most countries, however, do not have such an objective obstacle as the religious
tenets of Islam. And in those countries, the frugality hypothesis runs up against the basic
problem that it rests on a parochial view that resistance to consumer borrowing is an
artifact of any particular culture. The large role of consumer credit in most developed
countries suggests an alternative explanation, that a substantial amount of consumer
credit is a natural attribute of a fully developed economy, and that only some substantial
institutional obstacle – like the Islamic religion – will prevent that market from
developing.120 To illustrate that point, Table One shows the ratio of consumer credit to
GDP for 2000 for 19 countries.

CARDS INTERNATIONAL, Issue 319 (2004), at 14 [hereinafter Middle East Credit Cards]
(discussing business problems in fostering cards businesses in the Middle East).
117

It is difficult to judge the relevant level of economic development. In overall dollars,
Saudi Arabia has a relatively low level of GDP per capita (about $8500 in 2002, when the UK’s
was about $26,000 and the USA’s was about $36,000). I am assuming, however, that income
inequality in Saudi Arabia is greater than in the UK and the USA, and that the market for credit
card use is thus among a group of people with incomes more similar to those in the USA and the
UK.
118

It does not require a great deal of cynicism to anticipate that those rules will meet the
same fate in a developing merchant economy as the similar Christian rules against usury met in
the late Middle Ages.
119

See Indonesian Cards Barriers, supra note 108 (discussing efforts by Citibank to
foster use of revolving credit by Muslim population in Indonesia); Arnold, supra note 107
(discussing Citibank’s success in Indonesia).
120

See RAGHURAM G. RAJAN & LUIGI ZINGALES, SAVING CAPITALISM FROM THE
CAPITALISTS (2003).
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TABLE ONE: CONSUMER CREDIT/GDP121
country
cons. credit/gdp (%)
Canada
17.8
USA
16.4
UK
15.9
Singapore
15.1
Japan
14.4
France
12.0
South Korea
11.7
Australia
11.6
Netherlands
10.4
Hong Kong
9.1
Taiwan
8.0
Germany
7.0
Belgium
4.8
Brazil
4.7
Italy
3.9
Spain
3.5
Argentina
3.3
India
2.1
Mexico
0.5

Several things about that table are illuminating. First, with respect to the idea that
credit cards are necessary for a high level of consumer credit, consider two countries that
have similar cultures, but strikingly different levels of credit card usage: the United States
at the high end with more than 70 transactions per capita per year and the UK at the low
range with around 20 transactions per year. Both the United States and the UK are near
the top of the consumer credit chart, both with roughly 16%. Similarly, with respect to
the idea that cultural differences might be driving rates of borrowing, notice how the
continental EU countries (most of which have very low rates of credit card use) are
scattered throughout the distribution, from Spain and Italy at the bottom through Belgium
and Germany in the midrange, to the Netherlands and France near the top.122
What I see of importance in the chart, however, is that lesser developed countries
are likely to have a lower level of consumer credit: the three lowest countries are Mexico,

121
122

Based on data from Morgan Stanley.

For an older empirical study of the distribution of consumer credit in the EU, see
Nuria Diez Guardia, Consumer Credit in the European Union (ECRI Research Report No. 1)
(Feb. 2000). Also, compare the high place of the Netherlands on this table with the press reports
discussed above about the Dutch aversion to borrowing.
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India, and Argentina, doubtless the three least developed countries in that dataset. To get
a sense for what the chart says about more fully developed countries, consider the
example of Japan, which appears near the top of the chart despite a low rate of credit card
borrowing. The answer for Japan may be that the restrictions that have limited credit
card borrowing have resulted in a shift of the consumer credit market (at least as
compared to other countries) to less savory non-bank lenders such as sarakin and
yenya.123 Those lenders are considerably more likely to rely on extra-legal means of
enforcing their loans than the banks that have been prevented from developing a credit
card market. In the end, the consumer credit market is about the same size as in other
developed countries. It is just less hospitable to the borrowers that use it.124
Of course, the suggestion that consumer credit is more common in countries at an
advanced stage of development is not inconsistent with the view that consumer
borrowing has risen as the frugality characteristic of countries in a natural state is
overcome by the norm of American prodigality that accompanies globalization. If credit
card use has risen generally throughout the world, perhaps the reason is that the pressures
of globalization125 during the last decade have contributed to the development of a single
homogenized culture, of which credit card usage is a significant part. For example, my
studies in both Japan and the United Kingdom make it clear that the leading marketers of
modern revolving credit cards are either American companies or businesses that
consciously adopt the business practices of American companies.126
One problem with the globalization hypothesis is that the data discussed above do
not clearly indicate a convergence toward United States practices. On most of the
metrics illustrated in the tables above, the United States is an outlier, not a trendsetter.
So, to use the most obvious example, Figure Thirteen shows how the relative rate of
credit and debit card usage in the United States has for the last decade been rapidly
falling from an almost uniquely127 high rate to a rate much more in line with the practices
of most other developed countries. That evidence buttresses the historical explanation
provided above, which suggests that the situation of the United States depends on
attributes of its history that other countries do not share. If that explanation is correct,
then there is little reason to believe that other countries will have the same patterns of
123

Press reports suggest that recent Thai limits on credit cards might have a similar
effect, driving lower-income borrowers to “loan sharks.” See Arnold, supra note 107.
124

Although I have not yet collected data to support this hypothesis, I expect that in many
of the most developed countries that have relatively similar overall levels of consumer credit, the
individual components into which that credit is divided are likely to differ significantly.
125

For a general account of those pressures, see THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND
THE OLIVE TREE: UNDERSTANDING GLOBALIZATION (1999).
126
127

See Mann, Japanese Cards, supra note 39.

Japan’s rate of almost 100% credit card usage is, as I explain in Mann, Japanese
Cards, supra note 39, attributed to the use of a credit card product that in operation serves the
functional role that the debit card serves in most other countries. It also is characteristic of
countries with very small card markets (like South Africa).
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usage as the United States. Thus, although the spread of American cultural norms may
support the growth of the credit card to some degree, there is room for variation that
speeds or retards the rate of growth.
FIGURE THIRTEEN
DEBIT CARD TRANSACTIONS/CARD TRANSACTIONS
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The conflicting intuitions about the data suggested an empirical test to assess
whether the factor that relates to a high level of consumer credit is a high level of
economic development or assimilation of global culture. Accordingly, I regressed the
consumer credit data reported above against indicators of economic development and
globalization. For economic development, I used the level of GDP/capita. For
globalization, I used the globalization index published periodically by Foreign Policy.128
When those metrics were analyzed separately, each was significantly related to the level
of consumer credit as a share of GDP.129 When I combined both metrics in an OLS
regression, however, the globalization index lost its significance. Thus, only the level of
economic development retained any independent explanatory value.130 Although the

128

That index combines normalized data on a variety of things, including trade, foreign
investment, personal contact (through tourism and international travel), international telephone
traffic, and cross-border remittances. See How the Index is Calculated, available at.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/issue_janfeb_2003/gindexsidebar.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2003).
129
130

Each was significant at the 1% level.

In the multiple regression, GDP per capita was significant at the 5% level. The
adjusted R-squared of the model was 43%.
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evidence of course is rough, and limited to a small number of countries, it does support
the view that the institutional infrastructure associated with economic development is
more likely to explain the level of consumer credit than the weakening of cultural norms
against borrowing.
The second (and final) factor likely to affect the shifting usage pattern relates to
information. As suggested above, the availability of consumer credit information is
necessary for a successful credit card program. The pressures of globalization will only
make this problem more acute. Advances in information technology necessarily will
make it possible for issuers to make ever more effective use of that information – better
underwriting to predict losses, finer adjustment of products to reflect differentiations of
risks in different classes of cardholders, etc.131 That means that issuers in countries that
permit those uses to occur will be able to offer more attractive products successfully (that
is, profitably) than issuers in countries that continue to regard those uses with suspicion.
Turkey, for example, has what is by European standards a strikingly successful revolving
credit card market, attributable at least in part to its early development of a national credit
bureau.132 Thus, it is no surprise that in recent years the two largest developing countries
in the world – India and China – both have announced plans to support national credit
bureaus that would include both positive and negative information.133 Similarly, Hong
Kong recently introduced such a bureau to help rein in chargeoffs that increased by 600%
in the wake of the SARS crisis in 2002.134 Central banks are attending to this specific
concern even in the Middle East, where Islamic law at least technically prohibits lending
for profit.135
It is clear that culture will affect how information practices develop in ways more
complex than a binary question of availability suggests. Among other things, many
countries are likely to resist private credit bureaus. In France, for example, the
information that is available apparently is provided solely by the Banque of France.
There is good reason to think that public agencies will do a much less effective job at
making the information useful than the profit-oriented agencies in the West. For
example, press reports suggest that France and Italy are opposing moves to facilitate EU-

131

Mark Furletti, Credit Card Pricing Developments and Their Disclosure (Fed. Res.
Bank of Philadelphia, Payment Cards Center, Discussion Paper) (January 2003), discusses the
ever-finer parsing of consumers in the USA into separately priced risk classes.
132

See Turkish Card Growth Accelerates, CARDS INTERNATIONAL, Issue 321 (2004), at
16. For discussion of a recent similar effort in Portugal, see Portuguese Potential, supra note 46.
133

See Tony Morbin, Chinese to Launch National Credit Bureau in 2005, CARDS
INTERNATIONAL, Issue 325 (2004), at 3 (China); India Credit Bureau Set for Launch in 2005,
CARDS INTERNATIONAL, Issue 327 (2004), at 10 (India); India Unveils First National Credit
Bureau, CARDS INTERNATIONAL, Issue 319 (2004), at 8 (India).
134

See Hong Kong Returns to Profitability, CARDS INTERNATIONAL, Issue 320 (2004), at

12.
135

See Middle East Credit Cards, supra note 116 (discussing actions of central banks in
Oman, Kuwait, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Qatar).
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wide credit scoring. Of course, they also might do a much better job at protecting the
privacy of those whose information is involved.
To the extent that the success of the credit card depends in part on its pure
efficiency as a lending vehicle – and that surely is part of it – those pressures are likely to
make it harder to impose serious constraints on the products that issuers can provide their
customers. The natural outcome, then, is for those pressures to run headlong into the
burgeoning awareness of regulators around the world of the potential policy problems
that credit cards raise. It is too soon to tell what the ultimate shape of the regulatory
landscape will be. It is enough for this paper to sketch the factors that will shape the
incentives against which the regulators will act.
III. POLICY RESPONSES
Although the usage pattern of the payment card vis-à-vis other payment systems
takes different forms from country to country, it is clear that payment card and credit card
use have risen steadily over the last decade. Governments around the world have
responded to that phenomenon in different ways, and in large part, the policy responses
can be attributed to the regulatory priorities of the specific agencies charged with
regulating payments on a country-by- country basis and the specific usage patterns
existing in any particular country. Nevertheless, the problems associated with credit card
use are sufficiently similar to warrant comparative analysis.
Two overarching points warrant emphasis. The first relates to my emphasis.
From my perspective, the most serious policy issues presented by credit cards, especially
in the USA and the UK, arise from their relation to burgeoning levels of consumer debt
and bankruptcy. As the opening pages of this Article noted, a comprehensive regulatory
analysis of credit cards would consider a variety of policy initiatives not directly related
to that problem. Most obviously, a variety of perceived market failures have led to a
number of antitrust-related initiatives in several countries.136 The focus here, however, is
on the adverse effects that credit cards arguably have on broader economic measures of
debt and bankruptcy.
The second point relates to my strategy. My goal is to analyze policy initiatives
that respond to the harms that credit cards cause. As I have explained in the related
paper,137 increases in bankruptcy filings seem to relate to credit card borrowing, but rises
in overall borrowing levels can be attributed at least in part to the rise in credit card
spending directly. Thus, the most plausible policy initiatives are those that would stem
credit card use, and especially credit card debt. At the same time, the benefits of plastic
cards make it imprudent to stifle card-based spending altogether: the high social costs of
paper-based payment systems should undermine any proposal designed to push
136

Regulators also struggle with payment card fraud and the inequitable distribution of
card products among demographic groups.
137

See Mann, Cards Data Paper, supra note 3.
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consumers back toward the use of cash and checks.138 Thus, the most useful policy
initiatives probably are those that push people toward the use of debit cards, generally the
least expensive and most impervious to fraud of the electronic payment systems in
widespread use.139 Working from that perspective, the remainder of the Article considers
three groups of proposals: pricing regulation, affinity regulation, and disclosure
regulation. Existing regulation of those subjects reflects considerable variety from
country to country. My aim is not to articulate some “perfect” regulatory program for all
polities. Rather, I hope to assess in an informed and balanced manner the costs and
benefits of the most salient existing initiatives and a few obvious extensions of them.
A.

Permitting Merchant Surcharges

Perhaps because credit cards are used to implement a flow of money through a
substantial chain of parties participating in the transactions, it is not surprising that a
common regulatory response has been to react to the price structure of the credit-card
network, particularly the differential prices that merchants face when they accept credit
cards rather than competing payment systems. Specifically, regulators outside the USA
have imposed a variety of constraints – primarily with regulations directly setting prices
merchants (and their banks) pay to issuers for credit card services.140 Those approaches
for the most part have been directed at a problem quite distinct from my focus here – the
potential for differential interchange fees to increase the overall level of consumer
pricing. Accordingly, they are not directly relevant to my analysis here. Still, a closely
related initiative – permitting merchant surcharges – would respond to my concerns by
increasing the relative costs of credit cards as compared to debit cards and other payment
systems.
At the outset, it is important to note that the factual premise of that argument is
unclear. There is little reliable data on the actual “all-in” costs that merchants pay for

138

Even with the decline in use of cash and checks, those costs amount to more than 1%
of the gross domestic product in the USA. See David B. Humphrey & Allen N. Berger, Market
Failure and Resource Use: Economic Incentives to Use Different Instruments, in THE U.S.
PAYMENT SYSTEM: EFFICIENCY, RISK, AND THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE 45 (1988);
Swartz et al., supra note 7.
139
140

See MANN, PAYMENT SYSTEMS, supra note 17; Swartz et al., supra note 7.

See Office of Fair Trading, MasterCard Interchange Fees: Preliminary Conclusions
(Feb. 2003); RESERVE BANK OF AUSTRALIA, REFORM OF CREDIT CARD SCHEMES IN
AUSTRALIA: FINAL REFORMS AND REGULATORY IMPACT STATEMENT (Aug. 2002); Commission
Decision of 24 July 2002 (Case No. COMP/29.373); Commission Decision of 9 August 2001
(Case No. COMP/29.373) (the Visa litigation). The EU Commission recently initiated a similar
case against MasterCard. CI309:3. Press reports in early 2005 suggest that the Federal Reserve
Board may be considering the propriety of similar regulations in this country. Cards International
2005. CARDS INTERNATIONAL (2005). Issuers report that interchange fees are also being
reviewed in a number of other jurisdictions, including Poland, Spain, New Zealand, Portugal,
Mexico, Colombia, South Africa and Switzerland. See MasterCard Incorporated 10-K for year
ended December 31, 2004 at 14.
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accepting varying forms of payment.141 The most reliable existing data, however,
strongly suggests that credit cards often are (at least from the merchant’s perspective) the
most expensive systems and that debit cards are almost always less expensive than credit
cards, and often even cheaper than cash or checks (after taking account of the costs of
labor, delays in checkout lines, and the like.142 Although it is difficult to get reliable data
for other countries, the overall picture is similar. In Japan, for example, the discount rate
for credit card transactions typically is 3% or more.143 In the EU, the discount rate for
credit card transactions is about 1%.144
At the same time, we know that merchants typically do not charge more for credit
card payments than they do for other payments. Tying the matter back to the preceding
part of the article, however, that suggests a system in which consumers have an
inappropriately high incentive to use credit cards. The question, then, is whether
regulation can respond to that problem. The most logical way to think about that
question is to consider the prices charged among the various parties to a credit card
transaction. Looking at the credit card system in its simplest form, there are three
different pricing interfaces: the interface between the customer and the merchant; the
interface between the merchant and the credit-card issuer (or network); and the interface
between the credit-card issuer and the customer.

141

A growing body of literature attempts to assess the social costs of the various systems.
See, e.g., Humphrey & Berger, supra note 138 (the basic paper). A glance at the categories of
costs that are included, however, makes it clear that the data to make those determinations is not
readily available. For example, the accepted estimate for credit cards relies on 1985 data about
float times and processing costs.
142

See Food Marketing Institute, A Retailer’s Guide to Electronic Payment Systems
(1998); Swartz et al., supra note 7.
143
144

See Mann, Japanese Cards, supra note 39.

Interviews with British regulators and credit card executives. For the EU generally,
the rates are discussed in the Commission Decisions of 24 July 2002 and 9 August 2001 (both in
Case No. COMP/29.373).
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FIGURE FOURTEEN: PRICING INTERFACES
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Policy responses could address any of those three interfaces. Perhaps the
simplest response would be to directly prohibit the transactions or (which is much the
same thing) set low ceilings on the interest rates that could be charged. Although those
regulations would be most effective at stemming credit card use and borrowing, they also
raise questions far beyond those addressed in this paper, largely because (if they are to be
made effective) they would affect the entire consumer credit system. Regulations of that
sort can be examined only in the context of the consumer bankruptcy system against
which the credit system operates. When examined from that perspective, I conclude in a
related paper that it makes more sense to allow relatively unconstrained access to
consumer credit, together with a relatively lenient bankruptcy discharge.145 Thus, I do
not further address those types of responses to credit card borrowing in this paper.
Rather, this paper addresses policy responses that respond more specifically to problems
with credit cards in particular.
The interchange regulation discussed above responds indirectly to the problem by
addressing charges between the issuer and the merchant. A more direct and simpler
response would be for merchants to charge customers different prices based on the
payment system that purchasers use. That response would address the problem of crosssubsidization directly. Further, if merchants could price differentially based on the
amount each issuer or network charged, there might be greater competition in the market
for the rates merchants pay. Finally, higher charges might limit casual use, which would
address the problem of excessive or profligate use to a certain extent. The existing
evidence – from a policy in Norway under which banks charged customers per-item fees
for checks, but not debit card transactions – suggests that customers are highly sensitive
to such charges and would switch payment systems quickly to avoid them
. 146 The
145
146

See Mann, Backlash, supra note 10.

See David B. Humphrey, Moshe Kim & Bent Vale, Realizing the Gains from
Electronic Payments: Costs, Pricing, and Payment Choice, 33 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING
216 (2001).
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question, then, is why in a competitive retail market – something that certainly exists in
this country – merchants do not charge their customers differentially based on the
payment system that they select.
One answer in the USA is a wrongheaded legal system. For a time, federal law
actually barred any price discrimination between cash and credit card transactions.147
Current law has reversed that policy in part – TILA § 167 bars card issuers from
imposing any rule that would prevent merchants from granting discounts for payments by
methods other than a credit card. Thus, discounts for non credit card payments are now
lawful. That change has had a limited practical effect, however, because the card
networks continue to have rules that prevent merchants from imposing surcharges on
credit card use. At first glance, that would seem only a detail. Previous writers have
argued, however, that this distinction is important in practice. Frankel, for example,
suggests that it may be more acceptable in the retail marketplace for a merchant to charge
for credit card use – a service offered the customer for which the merchant must pay –
than to discount for cash, which could suggest to the consumer that the merchant’s price
might have an unduly high margin of profit.148 Other suggest that the problem is that a
discount-only system requires merchants to price all credit card transactions in the same
way – it does not permit, for example, distinctions between different types of credit cards
based on distinctions in their merchant-discount rates.149 Whatever the reason, the
legislative history of TILA suggests that credit card issuers fought hard for the right to
bar surcharges.150 Assuming that they were rational in doing so, it is reasonable to think
that the discount-only system is a substantial restraint on the practical ability of
merchants to discriminate in pricing. If that is so, then the existing statutory policy does
not really go far enough to foster full competition at the point of sale in merchantdiscount rates.
There are two reasons why a rule permitting merchant surcharges might be a poor
policy choice. The first is the most obvious: that the change would have no effect
because merchants would ignore it. It is not costless for merchants to construct a system
that subtracts a specified discount from transactions that are made with cash or other noncredit payment systems. Decisions must be made about the appropriate size of the
discounts and the transactions to which they will apply – will checks be covered or will
their higher costs justify a smaller discount? Sales terminals must be programmed to

147

See Dennis W. Carlton & Alan S. Frankel, The Antitrust Economics of Credit Card
Networks, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 643 (1995); Alan S. Frankel, Monopoly and Competition in the
Supply and Exchange of Money, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 313 (1998).
148

See Frankel, supra note 147; THALER, supra note 84.

149

See Edmund W. Kitch, The Framing Hypothesis: Is It Supported by Credit card Issuer
Opposition to a Surcharge on a Cash Price?, 6 J.L., ECON. & ORG. 217 (1990). Kitch points out
that the distinction between discounts and surcharges was important in the history of the statute,
which suggests that Congress recognized it was substantially limiting the effect of the statute by
validating only discounts but not surcharges.
150

See Kitch, supra note 149.
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reflect the new program. Customers must be educated about the program. Those costs
may not be overwhelming, but if they are substantial, and if merchants worry those
customers will rebel (as experience suggests they will) at paying more to use a credit
card, then merchants rationally might forgo investment in those programs.
A second concern, often noted in the existing literature, is the idea that surcharges
currently tend to appear in circumstances where merchants have substantial bargaining
power, so that the fees are used to extract a greater share of the surplus from the
underlying transaction. This is thought to be the case, for example, in Australia, where
firms with near monopoly power (like Qantas) appear to be the only merchants that
assess surcharges.151 That concern does not, however, seem troubling if one believes that
in most contexts consumers have choices in merchants and payment mechanisms, so that
unreasonably high surcharges will not lead to customers paying extortionate fees.
Moreover, if that belief is inaccurate or seems too naive, it also is true that merchants
often are in a position to take advantage of consumers regardless of whether a credit-card
surcharge is available to them.
At bottom, there is some reason to believe that we would see more merchant price
discrimination if legislatures invalidated network rules that prohibited surcharges. Other
countries – the UK, Netherlands, and Sweden – recently have taken similar steps.152 I do
not want to overstate the effects of such a change: it is unlikely that all or even most
merchants will charge. I also take seriously the notion that these charges may function
primarily to facilitate the exercise of market power by merchants that do not face
competition. But if that concern can be cabined, and if consumer welfare gains from
each merchant that does charge, there is some reason to invalidate the contracts that
prohibit it. To the extent that kind of price discrimination would result in consumer
choices more responsive to the true costs, it is probably a good thing, even if it occurs
only incrementally.
B. AFFINITY PROGRAMS
The failure of merchants to charge customers different amounts for different
payment systems is not the only reason that cardholders have a hyperoptimal incentive to
use cards when they make purchases. If the key problem is the divergence of private and
social cost for the consumer at the point of purchase, then any reform that helps to
remove the consumer’s private incentive to use the card might be helpful. Here, the most
obvious incentive is the affinity program, which gives consumers a tangible incentive to
use the card. The logic of the argument is to ask whether affinity programs should be
banned? All of them – cashback,153 airline miles,154 anything that is a tangible benefit

151

See Julian Wright, An Economic Analysis of a Card Payment Network (Dec. 2000).

152

See Matt Ablott, MasterCard and Visa Go Separate Ways on Surcharging, CARDS
INTERNATIONAL, Issue 325 (2004), at 10.
153

See CCM1002:54.
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that a third party awards to the consumer based on the consumer’s choice to use a credit
card at the point of sale. These programs are a major part of the competition by which
different issuers retain customers and encourage them to spend.155 It is difficult to
overestimate their importance to the industry’s growth: the share of loyalty cards in the
United States has grown from 10% – 25% since 2000, while the market share of standard
cards has fallen from 57% to 36% (with cobranded cards making up the third
category).156 The reason those cardholders are attractive is the industry’s perception that
they are better cardholders: recent data suggests that the average monthly expenditure on
a rewards card is $943, compared to $360 on a non-reward card.157
The variety of the programs is increasing rapidly, as technological advances
permit greater differentiation of benefits.158 For example, a burgeoning product that is
related to the products that I discuss here provide benefits not to the consumer but to a
third party organization of interest to the consumer: a recent program by Providian issues
Democratic National Party credit cards.159 As a matter of payments policy, prohibition of
those programs would directly increase the cost to the consumer of using a credit card
and thus would do much to mitigate the cross-subsidization problem that has troubled
overseas regulators.
It is less clear precisely what affect such a ban would have on the prodigality
problem that is the focus of this paper. It does seem likely that it would reduce credit
card usage. First, the fact that debit card usage is rising so rapidly even in the United
States – where affinity programs are pervasive for credit cards and uncommon for debit
cards – suggests that consumers in fact perceive a cost associated with using a credit card.
Second, as discussed above, the limited available evidence suggests that consumers are
highly sensitive even to small per-item transaction charges. In this context, for example,
one recent story declared the market advantages of a program that provides affinity
benefits as a device to help persuade tenants in Manhattan to use credit cards to pay their
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rent.160 Thus, a shift in the relative advantages of different payment systems – lowering
the per-transaction attractiveness of the credit card by approximately 1%161 – might shift
consumers away from credit cards in a significant way.
But a reduction in credit card usage does not directly match a reduction in
imprudent credit card borrowing. The best evidence on the effect such a reform might
have on credit card borrowing could come from Germany. Press reports suggest that the
2001 repeal of a similar law in Germany have been followed by rapid increases in credit
card usage.162 It is not clear yet, however, whether that increase in usage will lead to a
substantial increase in credit card debt.163 The empirical evidence I have analyzed in
other work suggests that a reduction in credit card spending might reduce overall
consumer credit, which in some jurisdictions would be thought to be a salutary policy
effect.
There is one narrow group of affinity programs, however, that do not raise that
problem, a growing set of programs that condition the affinity benefits on a cardholder’s
bill-payment practices. Specifically, those programs provide affinity benefits only to
cardholders that do not repay their bills completely each month.164 Another variant
(offered by American Express) increases the amount of the normal affinity benefit for
those cardholders that carry a monthly balance.165 In a sense, those programs provide
affinity benefits out of the interest revenues earned by the issuers. Because they are tied
directly to borrowing, they do not present the problem discussed above. Thus,
prohibition of those programs would respond to both the cross-subsidization problem and
the prodigality problem.
At first glance, of course, a ban on affinity programs seems politically insane,
because it involves a statute designed to protect consumers by taking away something of
value to consumers. But that should not be surprising. The basis for regulatory
intervention would be frankly paternalistic: that consumers do not accurately understand
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the costs of credit extended to them and that they are particularly vulnerable to
prodigality when the credit is extended through the convenience of a credit card.
Another obvious concern is that eliminating affinity programs would simply make
credit card issuing even more profitable than it is now. To understand that point,
consider data from Australia, where affinity programs are much less pervasive than they
are here: there, affinity programs cost about forty-six cents per transaction, about 20% of
all of the expenses of issuers on their card programs.166 Removing those costs would
raise the profits of card issuers substantially. But that assumes that all of the pricing is
entirely independent, and that removal of affinity expenses would have no effect on the
prices set at the other exchange points in the network.
As discussed above, that is a naïve view of the economics of credit card networks.
It is much more likely that credit card markets – at least in the competition among issuers
for active cardholders – are relatively competitive despite the highly oligopolistic
structure.167 Data from Australia, for example, suggests that the amount by which issuer
revenues exceed the costs of their operations and a reasonable profit is almost exactly the
amount by which they subsidize their cardholders with affinity programs.168 That
suggests that in the relative near-term a ban on affinity programs would result in a drop in
interchange rates through the simple press of competition, as outlined in the economic
models about the rational operation of a card network. If that occurs, then the crosssubsidization problem would be mitigated from a second side, reducing the cost
differential that merchants face (as well as the negative cost that attracts consumers).
This proposal is a tentative one, primarily a suggestion for exploration. There are
quite a number of details that would have to be worked out in the process of
implementation. For example, the proposal at the beginning of this section refers to
benefits provided by third parties. I doubt it would be useful for the proposal to apply to
retailer cards. In the context of retailer cards, an affinity program is simply a discount for
volume purchasing. Because the seller receives all of the revenue from the covered sales
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transaction, those cards do not raise the same price-discrimination problems as those
raised by third-party cards.169 Similarly, card issuers (especially those in the high-end
market) often provide a variety of nonmonetary benefits to cardholders that often are not
tied directly to purchases (access to travel counselors, personal shoppers, concierge
assistance, etc.)170 Those benefits are more in the nature of services provided in return
for the annual fee rather than an inducement to use the card. The logic of the proposal
suggests that it should be limited to consideration that is directly attributable to a
particular purchase or group of purchases; that problem raises some definitional
challenges.
There also is a fundamental question of justifying the regulatory intervention. In
particular, a skeptic might ask why we should care if card issuers give back excess
revenues through this device instead of charging lower interest or lower annual fees. The
basic answer – at least implicit in the concern about prodigality – is that consumers in
credit card markets cannot plausibly be viewed as entirely rational. The concern that
would motivate action here would be a perception that the affinity program is attractive to
the issuer because it is behaviorally seductive. Thus, from that perspective, the issuer
uses the affinity program to shift its costs and benefits in a way that takes advantage of
behavioral weaknesses.171 Reforms that force issuers to concentrate their monetary
relationship in the more transparent price point of an annual fee might enhance the
rationality of consumer action by lowering the information costs that give so much room
for behavioral departures from rational calculation. That perspective is particularly
important in the modern environment, in which competition on interest rates becomes
increasingly unimportant, as all interest rates are likely to move from point to point in
time as the creditworthiness of individual cardholders changes from time to time.
In the end, the viability of this proposal probably depends on the perspective of
the regulator in question. A regulator highly motivated to solve the cross-subsidization
problem might view the broad proposal as an important option. A regulator (like me) less
interested in that problem and more troubled by the prodigality problem might be
concerned that the proposal interferes with market transactions that are not tied with
sufficient directness to the problem. A regulator that both thinks the prodigality problem
is serious and is convinced that any decline in credit card spending would mitigate the
prodigality problem should think this proposal is quite valuable. Finally, any regulator
that takes the prodigality problem seriously should want to prohibit affinity programs that
reward carrying a monthly balance. Thus, those programs offer a good place to start any
such prohibition.
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C. REGULATING INFORMATION
The most intriguing response to the problems with credit card borrowing is to take
steps to alter the information available to those that borrow. After all, the problem is not
one of coercion, but simply one of consumers making decisions that do not seem to give
due weight to later adverse consequences. Furthermore, in a situation in which many of
the transactions are value-increasing, it is difficult to identify particular transactions that
should be prohibited. Thus, rules that help consumers make better decisions would be the
optimal response. The obvious problem, however, is that this kind of regulation is quite
often ineffective. As Bill Sage recently has discussed in the health-information context,
it is much easier to say that consumers are making bad decisions than it is to figure out
how to provide them information that will cause them to make better decisions.172 With
those concerns at the fore, the remaining pages of this essay outline an agenda for reform
of the rules that regulate the information provided to card users.
1. Special Rules for Minors
The simplest possibility is to establish special rules for minors. We might be less
troubled by frequent issuance of cards to minors if it was part of a strategy of making
credit readily available to all segments of the population; but there are still significant
groups of “unbanked” based on demographic factors such as age, marital status and the
like. Thus, there are good reasons to worry that issuance to minors reflects not pervasive
issuance, but rather opportunistic recognition of vulnerability.
If the concern about credit cards is that consumers use them without fully
appreciating the costs and risks associated with incurring substantial amounts of debt,
then we might be particularly concerned about transactions in which minors are involved.
The law in other contexts often relies on the possible susceptibility of minors to articulate
special paternalistic rules designed to protect minors from their own mistakes. Consider
for example rules invalidating certain contracts made by minors and rules validating
spendthrift trusts.173 In this context, some parallels are apparent. Most obviously,
Section 50 of Britain’s Consumer Credit Act flatly prohibits direct marketing of credit
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See William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and
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Nor is it unheard of to extend those rules to credit cards. For example, MONT. CODE
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recommend reforms that actually prohibit transactions. Accordingly, this section recommends
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issuance to minors entirely.
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cards to persons under the age of 18.174 Similarly, several states recently have adopted
rules restricting or studying the marketing of credit cards on campuses.175
There is good reason to think in this country that credit card institutions are
devoting a substantial amount of effort to marketing targeted at minors.176 For example,
recent news stories discuss initiatives in which major card issuers, with the approval of
university administrators, implement card-issuance programs directly on University
campuses.177
Such programs are most effective. For example, recent surveys suggest that 78%
of college students that have student loans also have credit cards, that about half of all
college students do not pay off their balances each month, and that the average
undergraduate student is carrying $2,748 in credit card debt.178 Even more sobering is a
recent CitiBank product, which offers 3% cash-back to minors based on their purchases –
but only if they do not repay their bills in full each month.179
The parallel to the efforts of cigarette manufacturers to get a foothold with young
customers is eerie. Although the psychological parallels between the marketing efforts
are doubtless only superficial, there is much to be said for the notion that the inadequate
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understanding of the risks of cigarette smoking that makes teenagers so vulnerable to the
temptation to smoke closely resembles the hyperbolic discounting that makes consumers
vulnerable to excessive ill-calculated borrowing decisions.180 At a general level, both
programs aim to get people immersed in a pattern of behavior while they are young that
will produce a long-term stream of income for the marketer – a pattern that is much easier
to initiate with an adolescent than with an adult.
A simple and direct response to this problem is obvious. Congress readily could
add to the Truth in Lending Act a provision based on Section 50 of the British statute.
Given the particularities of the American marketing practice, it almost might make sense
to extend the provision to include college students. It is difficult to imagine broadranging opposition to such a provision. {The next draft will address pending state
legislative initiatives.}
It is easy to imagine broader reforms, such as banning minor cards altogether,
treating debt incurred by minors differently in bankruptcy, or requiring special repayment
rules. Each of those has special problems that make them less attractive to me than the
narrower reform that I propose here. For example, for reasons discussed at the beginning
of this essay, my desire to give weight to the efficacy of the card as a payment system
makes me reluctant to deprive families of the ability to permit use of cards by their
children, particularly when their children are in a semi-independent situation like college.
Another possibility would be to subordinate in the Bankruptcy Code the right to recover
debts incurred by minors on credit cards. My concern about that proposal is that it does
raise a considerable possibility of a countervailing abuse by minors that might take
advantage of the rules. I am most ambivalent about special repayment rules – a baseline
idea might be to require those issuing cards to minors to require minimum payments that
would repay all debt within twelve months. That would have the virtue of quickly
bringing home to minors the real cost of the purchases and borrowing in which they have
engaged. At the same time, it seems to me much more complicated (and thus expensive)
to implement than the proposal I suggest and for that reason alone less palatable. Hence,
I worry that attention to that proposal might detract from my first proposal, which strikes
me as considerably less controversial.
2. Disclosures
The premise of this article is a link between prodigality, on the one hand, and the
ease of credit card borrowing and the failure of consumers to appreciate the risks of
borrowing in which they engage, on the other. That is not a new problem. Indeed, the
core policy of the Truth in Lending Act is to respond to unwise borrowing.181 The
specific response of the statute, of course, is not to prohibit the unwise transactions, but
instead the less paternalistic move of requiring the issuer to provide more information to
the cardholder.
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That is, of course, the common compromise solution in our laissez faire
regulatory regime. That solution makes sense in some contexts, for example those in
which sophisticated intermediaries can receive and process the information.182 The
difficulty with the situation here is that the information produced by the current system is
complex and that it is provided at the point when an account is opened, not at the point of
decision. Thus, it is not unduly pessimistic to say that the existing disclosure system is
for the most part a waste of money.183 It produces complicated paper disclosures of
information that is not comprehensible to the typical consumer and not particularly
useful, such as the total amount of interest that will be paid over time. Consumers are
unlikely even to read those disclosures.
More importantly for my purposes, much of the information is offered at the time
that the credit card application is sent and the account is opened.184 That is not a time at
which increased information is likely to be useful. A salient feature of the credit card
system is the separation between the time of the credit card application and the time of
the borrowing.185 TILA does not require any disclosure of information at the time of the
specific time of purchase or borrowing.186 If those are the points at which borrowers are
failing to appreciate the significance of their actions, then disclosures at those points
might be more effective. The existing disclosures for the most part are largely a waste of
resources that would be better expended in other ways.
For the system to work, the goals should be to get simple information presented at
the point of decision, or to develop systems for providing complex information to
intermediaries that can process it on behalf of consumers. At a big-picture level, that
suggests three different regulatory strategies: regulation of information at the time the
account is opened (the current strategy), regulation at the point of borrowing (in the
statement), and regulation at the point of sale (at the checkout counter). The sections that
follow assess each of those strategies.
(a) Disclosure at Account Opening
As discussed above, the conceptual problem with the existing set of disclosures is
that it produces a set of disclosures of complex information delivered to people that are

182

See Sage, supra note 172.

183

Thus, I find the recent legislation promoting so-called “Schumer boxes” an
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disinclined to assess them with care, at a time when they have no immediate reason to
attend to them.187 Thus, there is good reason to be skeptical about the benefits of any
reforms related to account-opening disclosures.
Having said that, the problem at this stage is exacerbated by the nature of the
market in which credit card issuers operate. Given the competitive pressures that issuers
face, issuers that do not exploit the advantages that the behavioral defects of their
customers present ineluctably will lose market share to issuers that do.188 The rapidly
increasing concentration of the market for credit card debt suggests that the companies
that are most skilled in understanding the behavioral capabilities of their customers are in
fact rapidly taking market share from those issuers that are not adept in that
undertaking.189
From the perspective discussed above, the appropriate regulatory response is to
force the production of the relevant information in a way that makes it amenable to
evaluation by intermediaries. Fortunately, the Internet makes that much easier than it
would have been when TILA was enacted, indeed much easier than it would have been a
year ago. Thus, Congress might require credit card issuers to post certain important
terms190 of their agreements in a uniform format on publicly available Internet sites.191
Congress also might require that any set of terms remain in effect for a certain minimum
period of time (90 days seems a reasonable period), to facilitate the activity of
intermediaries that might examine all of the postings and provide public assessments of
the various terms. In sum, despite the reasons to doubt the efficacy of such disclosures, a
policymaker concerned about the pressure issuers face in this area might consider the
suggestions summarized here as more likely than existing law to have a real impact on
the problem.
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The discussion in the preceding section suggests a market in which interest rates
that issuers charge to particular customers are so dynamic, changing from time to time
based on the credit position of the individual consumer. In such a market, it would make
little sense to require issuers to maintain fixed offers of interest rates. One exception
might be for so-called “teaser rates,” which might be defined as any offer of an
introductory rate that by contract is limited to a specific period. The existing literature
suggests an irrational behavioral focus by consumers on those rates.192 A specific set of
rules for those rates to facilitate comparison might require a uniform disclosure of the
period for which the rate is to last and of the overall annual interest rate a consumer
would pay if it borrowed a standard amount ($1000 for example) on the first day, paid the
relevant annual fee, and paid off the entire balance on the last date for which the teaser
rate would be available.
The problems with the existing system are presented most clearly in the recent
debate about universal default provisions. Essentially, universal default terms in credit
card agreements permit an issuer to raise the rate it charges one of its borrowers
substantially if that borrower commits a default on an unrelated debt, even if the
borrower has not missed a payment to the credit card issuer in question. Regulators,
upset by the application of those provisions, have responded by insisting that credit card
issuers provide more transparent disclosures related to those provisions in their
agreements with their customers.
That seems to me an entirely wrong-headed response. For one thing, it rests on
the premise that consumers that receive those disclosures will alter their behavior. I think
that is most improbable. First, most obviously, the modal consumer doubtless does not
read any terms placed in its credit card agreement. There are a variety of reasons,
rational and quasi-rational, for that behavior,193 but improving the type size of the
disclosure will not alter that outcome. Second, as the existing literature makes quite
clear,194 there is little reason to think that the rates for credit card debt that will be
charged at any point other than the immediately foreseeable future will affect the choices
consumers make in choosing between credit card products.
More fundamentally, an emphasis on disclosure misses the point. My sense is
that the underlying complaint of consumers is that the provisions are fundamentally
unfair: I shouldn’t have to pay more to Bank One simply because I was late on a payment
to Providian. Policymakers have retreated to a disclosure-based response because of their
unwillingness to press that fairness argument.
But in my view the fairness argument conceals a plausible economic argument for
barring universal default provisions. The argument in favor of universal default
provisions is that they are a highly effective part of the recent developments in the credit
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card market that have fostered segmentation of the market, which has led in turn to a
marked differentiation of rates among cardholders with different risk profiles.195 As a
general matter, that segmentation and differentiation strikes me as a good thing, because
it permits more accurate pricing to individual cardholders. In this context, however, that
seems much less clear, primarily because individual cardholders cannot possibly take the
pricing into account at the time of their borrowing: it is difficult when I make a purchase
today to factor in the likelihood that the interest rate on that purchase at some distant time
in the future will rise by some unspecified amount because of a default I make in a
payment to some other creditor. And if even an omnicompetent consumer could not take
account of the rate differentiation, then it is serving a much less valuable function.
Finally, getting to the heart of the matter, consider the likely effects of a flat
prohibition on universal default provisions. One possibility is that the implementation of
the provisions is entirely opportunistic, that they are exercised in response to events that
do not reflect any actual increase in risk level, that the reason they work is that the
switching costs for consumers in default are so high that the consumers have no marketdriven response to the elevated interest rate. I find that unlikely. Rather, my intuition is
that the universal default provisions reflect a reasoned (though perhaps imperfect)
elevation of interest rates in reaction to information that indicates an increased risk
level.196 If that is the case, then a prohibition on those provisions will not prevent lenders
from responding to the increased risk. Rather, it will have the natural effect of causing a
contraction of credit to those borrowers: more risk without an increased price must lead
to a limit on the available credit. From a broader societal perspective, that probably is a
response to be lauded. If we believe – as I do – that financial distress by cardholders
imposes externalities on the rest of us, and if we believe – as I do – that existing systems
probably encourage borrowers to wait too long before filing for bankruptcy, a system that
caused card issuers to terminate lending sooner might lower the social costs of financial
distress by pressing risky borrowers into a resolution of their affairs at an earlier date.
All of this is of course quite speculative, and rests on empirical intuitions that are
not particularly well-informed. It does, however, reflect considerably more attention to
the reality of disclosure and pricing than the existing simplistic reforms that would
require the expenditure of resources on disclosures that would likely have no positive
effect on the underlying problems.
(b) Disclosure at the Point of Borrowing
The next obvious point to consider is the possibility of disclosures at the point of
borrowing – which in the American system is the point at which the cardholder selects
the amount of its monthly payment. I am considerably more ambivalent about
disclosures that might affect the decision to select a monthly payment amount.
Supporting a regulatory response is the possibility that consumers will fail to appreciate
195
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the consequences of making low monthly payments. Under the current system, low
minimum payments join with the fees discussed in the text as part of a system that can
lead to aggregate outstanding balances far in excess of the original borrowed amount. On
the other hand, countervailing points make major reforms seem counterproductive. I am
quite skeptical about imposing a larger minimum-payment requirement by statute, largely
because cardholders in distress can obtain benefits from low minimum payments just as
surely as they can abuse them by repaying their balances too slowly.
Thus, what is left is a purely informational reform that might attempt to influence
the cardholder’s payment decision. Here, because the relevant information is tailored to
each particular bill, it seems implausible to rely on the strategy discussed in the previous
section, in which sophisticated intermediaries could filter and assess information on
behalf of cardholders. Hence, a judicious response must settle for attempting to disclose
information that is sufficiently simple and comprehensible to be understood by a typical
cardholder. It also is important that any disclosure requirement be sufficiently simple
that an issuer can implement it with relatively low expenditures.
Tentatively, for those who think any such reform could be useful, I suggest a
requirement that each statement include a plain statement indicating the date by which a
cardholder would pay its balance in full if it made no further purchases and continued to
make equal monthly payments in an amount equal to the last monthly payment. Thus, for
example, a March 1, 2005 statement to a cardholder that paid half of the bill in February
2005 might indicate that the balance would be paid in full with two further payments; a
similar statement to a cardholder that paid only 3% of the balance might indicate that the
balance would be paid in full with sixty further equal payments (if that is the correct
figure, taking account of the appropriate interest rate).
(c) Disclosure at the Point of Sale
The final possibility is to regulate the information provided to customers at the
point of sale. Presently, federal law does not require contemporaneous disclosures at the
point of sale for credit transactions governed by TILA, though it does require a tangible
acknowledgment of the transaction (typically a printed receipt) for transactions governed
by the EFTA.197 The plausibility of a regulatory focus on the point of sale is underscored
by widely noted shifts in the revenue models of credit card issuers. Two traditional
revenue sources – annual fees and interest revenues – have declined substantially in
importance by comparison to fees for such things as late charges and overlimit
transactions.198 For example, between 1994 and 1998, interest income rose by about 70%
(from $34 billion to $58 billion), while penalty charges rose by about 125% (from $8
billion to $18 billion) and late fees rose by more than 300% (from $1.7 billion to $7.3
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See Furletti, supra note 131.
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billion).199 Current industry statistics indicate that the average late fee among large
issuers is now more than $30,200 and the average overlimit fee is now over $29.201
Based on experience in my household (which has paid a significant amount of late
fees over the last few years), it seems quite likely that a substantial amount of those fees
does not reflect financial distress, but an imperfect ability to manage information related
to the credit card. The payment is not late because the money is not there, but because of
an imperfect effort to time the payment to fall on the latest possible day. The transaction
does not go over the limit because of a crisis-driven need to borrow to the hilt, but
because of a lack of information as to exactly how much is outstanding on any particular
card at any particular time. The validity of that point of course is an empirical question.
I do not really know what share of late charges and overlimit fees accrue on accounts that
are not generally in default, but that is my point. If we knew that a substantial amount of
those fees were incurred because of mistakes rather than a “true” need for the funds, it
would be an indictment of the business model that relies on those fees so heavily.
As an informational matter, that problem resonates with much of the discussion in
my related papers. We in fact know very little empirically about the operation of the card
system in this country. It is an embarrassment that the regulatory authorities in other
countries (Australia and the UK in particular) have so much more accurate historical and
current information about payment systems in their countries than we have in this
country. If these issues present problems of concern to policymakers, a first step that
should encounter little opposition would be for some agency of the government to begin
collecting some minimal amounts of information about the subject. On questions of
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See Demos, supra note 85, at 35-36.
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See http://www.cardweb.com/carddata/charts/latepayment_fees.amp. The amount has
increased by 45% since 1998 and 176% since 1993. See Dec. 5, 2003 CardFlash. Part of the
cause of the increased revenue from late payment fees doubtless is the persistent shortening of
grace periods. The average grace period has fallen from 29.7 days in 1990 to 21.5 days at the end
of 2001. See http://www.cardweb.com/carddata/charts/grace_periods_endofyear_averages.amp.
There also appears to be an increasingly technical approach that credit card companies use to
determining when payments arrive. See Liz Pulliam Weston, More Games the Credit-Card
Companies
Play,
available
at
http://moneycentral.msn.com/content/Banking/Yourcreditrating/P51865.asp (discussing practices
under which payments are not treated as received on the date that they reach the credit card
issuer’s processing center). The problem also is exacerbated by the impression created by media
reports, that card issuers are much more likely to battle customers over small billing disputes than
in former years. See ConsumerReports.org, Credit Cards: What’s Wrong with This Bill (January
9, 2004), available at www.consumerreports.org (last visited January 9, 2004); W.A. Lee,
Magazine Slams Industry, Regulators over Bill Disputes, AM. BANKER, Jan. 9, 2004.
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See http://www.cardweb.com/carddata/charts/overlimit_fees.amp. That amount is
42% larger than the comparable 1998 figure and 141% higher than the comparable 1993 figure.
See Dec. 5, 2003 CardFlash.
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particular interest, targeted government data collection seems appropriate. The relation
between late and penalty fees and financial distress seems an obvious candidate.202
That discussion suggests that a disclosure system keyed to the point of borrowing
could be more effective than the existing disclosure system keyed to the point at which
the line of credit is authorized. Specifically, I suggest that it might alter the actions of
cardholders in a substantial way if they were advised at the time of each transaction as to
the amount of their credit line, the amount of credit available at the time of the
transaction, and any overlimit or other fees that would be charged to them for engaging in
the transaction in question. In transactions that are authorized “online” with a
contemporaneous electronic communication from the issuer, the relevant information
could be transmitted to the merchant along with the authorization; the merchant’s
payment terminal could display the information to the cardholder before the cardholder
finally approves the transaction. The EFTA already requires a paper receipt in electronic
point-of-sale payments.203 Essentially, this would be similar to the common screen
requiring the cardholder to approve a fee charged by an out-of-system ATM machine
before the transaction proceeds.
As with the proposal related to affinity fees, this proposal would require
considerable delineation before it could be enacted. Thus, it would not be practical for
Congress to articulate the details of the proposal. Among other things, the proposal
would depend on alterations in the method by which terminals process transactions.
Details about such things could be ironed out only after consultation with affected
industry groups – terminal manufacturers, issuers, acquirers, and merchants.204
Moreover, it well might be impractical to extend the proposal to the small share of
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Specifically, it would be interesting to know what share of accounts that pay late
charges or overlimit fees become delinquent by 30 days within 12 months after payment of such a
fee and the extent to which that share differs significantly from the share in the overall pool of
cardholders. My hypothesis is that there would be little significant risk of default presented by
cardholders that incur an overlimit fee or a late charge for a payment less than five days late, and
have not incurred a similar charge during the preceding 12 months.
203
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See Regulation E, 12 CFR § 205.9(a).

The Federal Reserve recently estimated in a study of the possibility of disclosing fees
in debit transactions that the costs would be quite high, in the range of $5 - $10 billion. Federal
Reserve System, Board of Governors of, Report to the Congress on the Disclosure of Point-ofSale Debit Fees 34-35 (November 2004). I am skeptical that in the long run this proposal would
impose costs nearly so high as those that the Federal Reserve suggests, in part because the
Federal Reserve appears to have accepted industry estimates of high costs for such things as
reprogramming network accessible databases to provide the relevant information, without
recognizing the increasingly routine nature of changes to the technology of such databases. In
any event, it certainly is true that the costs of implementation could be minimized by a process
that included industry consultation to facilitate an adequate transition period and standardization
of format. Moreover, whatever the costs of such a system might be today, they certainly will
continue to decline rapidly with advances in information technology, and the accompanying
advances in the sophistication of typical merchant terminals and payment-processing networks.
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transactions that are cleared without contemporaneous electronic authorization.205 Those
details should be left to the Federal Reserve for implementation through amendments to
Regulation Z. The broad outlines discussed above, however, would be suitable for
implementation through amendments to the Truth in Lending Act.
IV. CONCLUSION
The appropriate regulatory response to the credit card phenomenon must take
account both of the effectiveness of credit cards as a device for payment and borrowing
and at the same time attend to the risks that the credit card will lead to prodigal behavior
that harms users and imposes externalities on the rest of society. I have suggested a
number of specific statutory reforms – rules permitting merchants to impose surcharges
for credit card use, limiting affinity programs and universal default provisions, barring
marketing that targets minors, and revamping the disclosure system. But my broader
goal is to further a general understanding of that phenomenon. I certainly would not
suggest that I have solved the basic problem of the credit card. I do hope, however, that I
have provided some food for thought about it.
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In countries that clear a smaller share of their transactions electronically (a category
that includes most if not all countries other than the United States), this proposal would impose
much greater costs and thus be much less practical.

DATA APPENDIX
Nilson Report: The Nilson Report is a proprietary periodical that reports detailed
information about all aspects of credit and debit card transactions in the United States and
a variety of information about other countries. Because it is proprietary, it is not clear
exactly how it is collected. It is, however, plainly the best source for the United States, in
the absence of any substantial public statistical source.
BIS Data: The most general source of data is the Bank for International
Settlements’ series Statistics on Payment and Settlement Systems in Selected Countries
and Statistics on Payment Systems in the Group of Ten Countries. The first of those (the
so-called “Red Book”) now includes information on Belgium, Canada, France, Germany,
Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Singapore, Sweden, and Switzerland. The G-10
series includes information on Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy,
Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
The information typically includes whatever information is available about the
number and value of credit and debit card transactions, as well as matching information
about GDP, population, and exchange rate. The data are obtained from the central banks
of the respective nations. The problem with relying on the data is that they are
inconsistent, in the sense that different publications report different data for the same
year. For example, the 1999, 2000, and 2001 G-10 publications all might report different
numbers for 1998 credit card transactions in Japan. The data also (as with Canada)
commonly include such serious discontinuities in the data as to suggest a shift in data
collection techniques. Because the data come from central banks, I do not think I should
dismiss them as unreliable. I do not, however, use them whenever I have better data
sources available.
Euromonitor: Euromonitor publishes an extensive set of information about a large
number of countries. Ultimately, however, I decided that the data has too many errors to
make it reliable. The difficulty is that in the few countries where I am confident that I
have reliable information directly from central banks (Canada and the UK, for example),
the Euromonitor data is widely off (much lower than the central bank data).
Australia: Australia has the best collection of information in the world.
Substantially all of the relevant information is on the Royal Bank’s Web site at
www.rba.gov.au. From that site I collected information on the number and value of
credit and debit card transactions, as well as information about credit card debt. I
collected information on population, GDP, and exchange rates from the World Bank’s
WDI database. Because they were not available at WDI, I collected 2002 information on
population from www.abs.gov.au/ausstats, GDP from www.rba.gov.au, and exchange
rate from www.xe.com.
Belgium: The National Bank of Belgium provided information on the number
and amount of credit card and debit card transactions. I collected information on
population and GDP from the World Bank’s WDI database.
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Canada: I have collected data on Canada from a variety of sources. Data on the
number of credit card and debit card transactions has been compiled from the Nilson
Report, a proprietary periodical, supplemented with data from Interac (Canada’s local
debit- card system), www.interac.org. For information on credit card debt, and on ratios
of credit card debt to credit card volume, I have accepted the advice of the Bank of
Canada and rely on data about Visa and MasterCard transactions, which the Bank has
provided to me. Data on fraud are from epaynews.com. I collected information on
population, GDP, and exchange rate from the World Bank’s WDI database. Because
2002 information was not in WDI, I collected 2002 population from CIA World Factbook
(www.cia.gov) and the 2002 exchange rate from www.x-rates.com.
China: I collected information on the value and number of credit and debit card
transactions, population, GDP, and exchange rates from Payment Systems in EMEAP
Countries, published in July 2002 by the Working Group on Payment and Settlement
Systems of the Executives’ Meeting of East Asia-Pacific Central Banks and Monetary
Authorities (EMEAP). This publication is modeled on the BIS publications, but includes
information on a number of East Asian countries.
France: Data on France is hard to acquire, because the system is dominated by
the Cartes Bancaires card, offered by a consortium of banks. It is easy to obtain statistics
about that system, but not about the card products offered outside that system. I collected
information on population from the World Bank’s WDI database.
Italy: I collected data on the value and amount of credit and debit card
transactions, population, GDP, and exchange rates from the BIS publications.
Japan: I collected data on credit and debit card transactions from the BIS
publications. Data on fraud are from the Japan Consumer Credit Industry Association’s
annual yearbook. I collected information on population and GDP from the World Bank’s
WDI database.
Netherlands: I collected data on population, GDP, and the number and amount of
credit and debit card transactions from the BIS publications.
New Zealand: I collected information on credit card debt and volume from the
central bank’s Web site at www.rbnz.govt.nz.
South Korea: For information on credit card debt and credit card volume, I rely
on information published in Cards International, supplemented with related unpublished
data collected by Anthony O’Brien. I collected information on GDP from the World
Bank’s WDI database. I collected information on exchange rates from www.x-rates.com
(because it was not available in the WDI database).
Sweden: I collected information on the value and amount of debit and credit card
transactions, population, GDP, and exchange rates from the BIS publications.
UK: The most general source of information is APACS (the Association for
Payment Clearing Services), www.apacs.org.uk. I have relied on APACS’s Plastic Card
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Review 2002 for information about the number and amount of credit and debit card
transactions.
Data on fraud are from Cardwatch (an arm of APACS),
www.cardwatch.org.uk. For credit card debt, I rely on information provided to me by the
Bank of England. I collected information on population, GDP, and exchange rates from
the World Bank’s WDI database.
USA: There is no general governmental source for information about credit-card and
debit- card transactions in the United States. The most widely used source is the Nilson
Report. I have compiled from various issues of that periodical data about the number and
amount of credit and debit card transactions and about credit card debt. Data on fraud are
from epaynews.com. I collected information on population and GDP from the World
Bank’s WDI database. The information in Figure Nine about noncash consumer payment
systems also is from the Nilson Report.

